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PREFACE
Our interest in subsidized consumption systems and in the Pakistan
case in particular, stems in part from the INP Program's involvement
during the past few years in nutrition planning in Pakistan. It was
the Government of Pakistan which coined the term consumption planning,
and Namet Ilahi and his colleagues in the Planning Commission have
been examining the operational implications of such planning.
On a more general level, as nutrition planners and advocates we
have been interested in examining the nutritional implications of
programs implemented for other purposes. In most low income countries
it is difficult to obtain large appropriations for nutrition and
other welfare programs which are by definition geared to the poor.
Therefore, we believe it is important for nutrition advocates to
monitor the effects on nutrition of programs and policies in a broad
range of development sectors, and to use their influence to modify
those programs in nutritionally beneficial ways.
While it is unlikely that many countries would undertake subsidized
consumption systems purely for the purpose of aiding the poor, there
has been increasing interest of late in the question of utilizing such
systems for nutrition and income redistributional purposes where they
are already operating. There is also discussion among food aid donors
of the possibility of tying at least a portion of concessional sales
to distribution through a subsidized consumption system to assure
benefits to the poor. This positive interest in subsidized consumption
ii
is at odds with the traditionally bad name given to food rationing and
food subsidies. According to the conventional wisdom, these mechanisms
have exorbitantly high administrative opportunity costs, represent a
major budgetary drain, result in a misallocation of resources, and
should be employed only as short-term measures during periods of
severe food scarcity. Accordingly, international banks and development
organizations often encourage low income governments to eliminate or
significantly reduce these systems. Ironically, these same organizations
often carry out explicit programs designed to affect nutrition and
income distribution which would probably be considered highly
successful it they produced results comparable to those reported in
this paper.
There is remarkably little literature on subsidized consumption
systems from any perspective. The explanation for this absence of study
may be largely a matter of bailiwick. The agronomist has been concerned
traditionally with agricultural production, the agricultural economist
with production economics and with the distribution system up to the
market place, and the nutritionist, generally, with distribution
between the front door and the stomach. The one group which has been
involved in this part of the distribution system are those concerned
with private sector marketing, and their interest in public distribution
systems has been minimal. As a result, the consumption end of the
distribution system in low income countries has been largely ignored.
Although both of the authors have worked in Pakistan and are
reasonably familiar with the country, the analysis for this paper was
iii
carried out in Cambridge using Pakistani data collected for other
purposes. Despite these limitations we have been able to begin
addressing a number of the questions one would wish to ask of such
systems: whether they work; who benefits; and how much they cost.
This study then, and others which we hope will follow, begin
to examine the economic and political feasibility of subsidized
consumption systems, their potential. effectiveness in achieving
nutritional and income distributional ends, the preconditions under
which they might be effective, and the forms which would be most
appropriate for particular sets of preconditions.
B.L. Rogers and F.J. Levinson
Cambridge, Massachusetts
April 1976

INTRODUCTION
In almost all countries of the world, the production and
distribution of food is regulated in some manner by the government.
Government policies may restrict or promote imports or exports of
food; they may grant implicit or explicit subsidies to the agricultural
sector, or to industry at the expense of agriculture; or they may
influence the wholesale or retail market for various commodities.
All of these policies affect, directly or indirectly, the retail
price of food sold within the country. In the wealthy nations of
Europe and North America, agricultural policy is generally protectionist
and operates to maintain food prices at a higher level than they would
be in the absence of government intervention. Since incomes in these
countries are high, and the proportion of income spent on food relatively
low, the majority of their populations are able to maintain an
adequate level of food consumption is spite of these prices.
In developing countries, incomes are low and malnutrition is
widespread. Thus higher food prices are likely to have far more serious
negative consequences for the consumer. At the same time, these countries
experience a low level of agricultural productivity in terms of both
labor and land, which resultsin food shortages at home and inadequate
quantities of food for export. Policy makers in low-income countries
are thus faced with conflicting objective in influencing food prices:
higher prices might encourage increased production but they will also
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reduce food consumption among the portion of the population most
vulnerable to malnutrition. One means of resolving this conflict
has been to institute government subsidies on the consumer prices of
selected foods. These subsidies take various forms, but they all
provide a mechanism by which the government fills the gap between
desirable producer prices and prices which allow an adequate diet
to the low-income consumers.
This paper will describe in detail one such program: The ration
shop system in Pakistan. We will attempt to estimate the extent of
its benefits to consumers and its costs to the nation, and to show
how particular aspects of the program contribute to its overall
effectiveness. Critics of the concept of consumer food subsidies cite
as problems the high cost of these programs and the extent to which
benefits reach individuals not in the target group. The Pakistan
ration shop system would seem to demonstrate that these problems
may not be insurmountable. It also appears that the Pakistan approach to sub-
sidized consumption has advantages which render it viable, while
programs which may appear more advantageous in theoretical terms have
worked less well in practice.
In this paper, we will first discuss some of the theoretical
issues involved in the manipulation of food prices. We will then
describe the origins and the present structure of the Pakistani
ration shop system. Details of the ration program's operation can
be found in the appendix to this report. Discussion following the
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program description will focus on four major questions; 1) who
benefits from the system? 2) what does it cost, and who bears the
costs? 3) what would be the effect on costs and benefits of changes
in the system? 4) how dependent is the system on international food
aid? Finally, we will attempt to draw some conclusions regarding
the Pakistani program and its implications for similar programs in
other countries.
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I. AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND THE ROLE OF FOOD SUBSIDIES
Historical Approaches to Agricultural Price Policy
Agricultural prices historically have been manipulated in
low-income countries to serve the purposes of economic development
rather than to increase levels of individual consumption per se.
Early theories of development held that agricultural prices should
be kept low relative to prices in the industrial sector, in order
to promote investment in industry. This idea originated with Ricardo's
belief that food was the key wage good, and therefore low food prices
would keep wages low, enabling industry to take advantage of cheap
labor. The relatively higher profitability of industrial products
would provide the incentive for expansion of this sector and the profits
would provide capital for reinvestment Since wages are devoted
almost exclusively to consumption, higher wages which result in reduced
profits would lower the rate of investment and therefore slow the rate
of economic growth. This policy of low agricultural prices was initially
2.
followed by a number of developing countries in part because they
were operating under the popular misconception that industrialization,
if not synonymous with economic developmentwas the surest path to
achieving it. This misconception was fostered by the various "stage"
theories of growth, which identify "developed" with "industrialized"
economies. In addition, the psychological association of reliance on
agriculture with economic backwardness and exploitation discredited
and discouraged serious concern with this sector in many national governments.
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The consequences of this policy were unfortunate. Farmers shifted
from food crops to more profitable cash crops where this was
possible, reducing the availability of food on the market. The
agricultural sector in many countries stagnated, due to institutional
constraints as well as to the absence of price incentives for
agricultural investment.
By the end of the 1950's, experience had demonstrated that
agriculture as well as industry was a vital component of economic
growth . Economists began to recognize that, in order to make the
transfer of labor to the industrial sector possible, agricultural
production would have to be maintained at least at the same level
with fewer workers, which meant that the average productivity of
5labor in this sector would have to be improved. In fact, an even
higher level of production would be needed to avoid inflation as
increasing productivity in the industrial sector led to higher
6
wages and a higher level of demand for food. Furthermore , it was
realized that the agricultural sector in developing countries frequently
employs the majority of the labor force, provides more than half the
gross domestic product, and in many cases accounts for a substantial
proportion of export earnings as well.7,8 It was recognized that
the agricultural sector is essential in providing a domestic market
for manufactured goods, and must be the major source of savings for
capital formation, and of foreign exchange for the purchase of industrial
capital goods as well as imported consumer products. These functions
-6-
of the agricultural sector cannot be fulfilled unless agricultural
production and income are increasing. In order to increase productivity,
investment in agricultural inputs must be made at the same time that
capital is being provided to the industrial sector, and an increase
in domestic demand requires higher incomes in this sector, so that
consumption as well as investment may increase. Based on such reasoning,
many countries have shifted to a policy of maintaining high prices
for agricultural products, in an attempt to encourage increased
production.9' 10
Effects of Prices on Producers
There has been considerable controversy in the literature as to
whether farmers in subsistence economies respond to price incentives
by increasing output and the quantity marketed, or whether they
produce only for their own consumption and fixed economic needs, so
that higher prices for their produce would result in a smaller quantity
being put on the market.
The balance of recent evidence indicates that except for those
operating just at or below subsistence levels, farmers in developing
countries do demonstrate price responsiveness both in terms of output
12
and of quantity marketed. The price elasticity of the marketed quantity
13,14
is higher for cash crops than for subsistence crops,, tends to be
15
higher for larger landholders, and is of course subject to the constraint
16
of weather, but it is positive under most conditions. The idea
that small farmers have no incentive to raise their level of living
-7-
by producing and marketing more has been found to be generally
17
false.
18
Mellor has raised the question of whether price incentives
are capable of raising aggregate agricultural production, or
whether farmers simply shift the fixed quantity of their resources
between crops based on changes in relative price. He argues that,
in the face of static agricultural technology, only relative outputs
are altered in response to price changes. This may be so, but it
is characteristic of the agriculture of developing countries that
there is considerable scope for the application of improved techniques
of cultivation. The evidence is that farmers in developing countries
usually behave in an economically "rational" way, by maximizing
their output based on their present level of knowledge and technology19,20
Therefore, the expansion of agricultural outputs should result if
two conditions are fulfilled: first, new techniques and education
in their use must be available, and second, there must be an economic
incentive to adopt these techniques and increase production. Several
authors 21,22 have stressed that the objective of positive agricultural
price policies is not only to encourage increased production by present
methods, but to promote the adoption of new inputs and methods as well,
and so prices must be maintained at levels high enough to cover the
costs of these new techniques. The inference to be drawn is that
expansion of aggregate agricultural production through price incentives
may be possible under certain conditions, if the technology is available.
-8-
Several countries, including Pakistan, have attributed their success
in raising levels of food production to their success in raising
levels of food production to their policies of price support and
23
stabilization.
It has been argued that,in fact, positive price policies cannot
be said to prevail in a country unless agricultural prices are free
to rise to the level of the international market. Restrictions on
exports are said to depress prices below their free market level,
discouraging production and resulting in a misallocation of resources.24
Since the international market represents the composite of many nations'
interference with their own imports and exports, it is not obvious
that its price levels are any less distorted from some hypothetical
free market price than are prices in an individual country. Of course,
it is true that, if the international price for a commodity is
higher than the domestic price, farmers who sell their output at home
are incurring an opportunity cost, and the nation which does not
export is losing potential foreign exchange. Nonetheless, some
governments may consider it worthwhile to prohibit exports in order
to keep food supplies in the country which would otherwise be lost.
Given the disparity in incomes between developed and developing nations,
rich countries will probably always be able to bid more for foodstuffs
than the population of poor countries can pay for their own consumption.
Governments may also impose export taxes or maintain a monopoly on
export trade in order to obtain scarce foreign exchange for investment
in national development projects, rather than allow it to go into
-9-
private hands where it might be spent on high consumption levels or
invested outside the country, The fact that so many countries restrict
export trade in some way indicates that there is a strong felt need
for such interventions. Clearly also, there is no inherent relationship
between these trade restrictions and the concept of subsidized food
consumption although the latter has been frequently criticized on the
basis of its association with the former.
Effects of Prices on Consunmers
The primary objective of maintaining high agricultural prices
is to stimulate production. One of the principal reasons for
increasing production is to ensure adequate food supplies to the
population, but it may be that these very prices adversely affect
food consumption, especially among low income groups most vulnerable
to malnutrition.
Food is usually cited as a textbook example of a commodity
with a relatively low price elasticity of demand. No matter how
low prices fall, there is an upper limit on the quantity of food
a household will consume, the argument goes, and no matter how
high they rise, there is a minimum which every household must consume
for survival. This relationship certainly holds for the developed
nations, where incomes are high and the majority of consumers obtain
supplies of food which are at least adequate to permit normal growth
and maintenance of health. In developing countries with low per capita
-10-
incomes, the price elasticity of demand for food is,in fact,high
among the lower income groups.25,26,27 As prices rise, poor consumers
reduce their purchases of food, This is to be expected, since typically
in developing countries, the low-income population devotes well over
half of its income to food, and more than half the population may
qualify as low-income. The average level of food consumption per
capita in these countries is often close to the minimum needed for
the maintenance of health, and there is considerable evidence that
food consumption among the underprivileged is generally below that
minimum. Under these circumstances, it may be expected that a rise
in real food prices would have serious consequences for food consumption,
and therefore for the health of the low-income population. This would
be the case for poor farmers as well as for poor urban consumers.
High prices benefit food producers in proportion to the size of their
marketed surplus, and low income farmers market a smaller proportion
of their output than those who are better off.28 Most poor farmers
in developing countries are net food purchasers even though they market
some of what they produce, and so would lose more than they gain from
29
high agricultural prices. ' It would seem, therefore, that while
high food prices may fulfill several objectives of economic development,
they may also prove detrimental to the immediate well-being of much
of the population. Since,ultimately,the achievement of economic
development in a country must be defined in terms of the improved level
of living of its people, it seems perverse to adopt strategies of
-11-
development which reduce the already low living standard of the
poor in order ,indirectly, to improve it.
Consumer Price Subsidies
The problem facing governments is to allow an adequate level
of consumption among the vulnerable poor while still maintaining
price incentives to farmers. The fact that farm production is responsive
to price incentives indicates that a level of food production in-
sufficient to meet the needs of the ppulation is due not so much to
inadequate capacity to produce as to a level of effective demand
too low to stimulate needed Droduction. That is, the majority of
consumers cannot afford to purchase food at prices high enough to
cover the costs of increased production and improved technology.
The most direct approach to solving the food problem would be to
provide increased income to those groups with a high income elasticity
of demand for food, that is, the poor.* In Pakistan, as in most
countries, there are strong political and social pressures against
such a solution. One alternative which has been used in a number of
countries is a program of consumer price subsidies. Such programs
have been implemented for a variety of reasons: 1) to ensure equitable
distribution of food during periods of shortage; 2) to minimize social
disruption in cities, often a function of rising food prices; 3) to
stimulate investment in the industrial sector; 4) to provide assistance
to the needy.
* This assumes that food supply would increase promptly in response to an
increase in demand. In fact, the more likely result would be inflation
in the short run. These conditions would appear to constitute an
ideal setting for a timely infusion of international food'aid.
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Although the last of these has not been a major motivation
in establishing these systems, it appears that consumption subsidies
under some conditions may have important nutritional and income
distributional effects.
These programs are frequently criticized because of the presumption
that they involve high budgetary requirements, substantial adminstrative
opportunity costs, a high proportion of leakage to non-needy groups,
and a depressing effect on agricultural prices and production. While
these characteristics have been associated with consumption subsidies
in some countries, it is not clear that any of them are inherent in
the concept of subsidizing consumer prices. We believe that a program
of consumer price subsidies can operate effectively and avoid the problems
mentioned above if four conditions are met. First, the program must
be one in which the government has the flexibility to control it own
level of cost. If the program is committed to a fixed selling price,
as for example, Sri Lanka was with its free rice ration, and if the
procurement price is rising both domestically and on the world market,
then the total cost of the program must continue to rise without limit,ren-
dering it prohibitive*. If the selling price of the subsidized commodities
is permitted to vary, then the government can keep the cost of the
* The question of what constitutes a prohibitive level of cost is a matter
of policy for each nation. Governments routinely commit themselves to
quite costly non-investment prograns in areas suct as defense ,and there
is no obvious reason why nutrition programs should not merit similar
levels of spending. However, most governments limit their expenditure on
these programs and nutrition planners and advocates must learn to
maximize the effectiveness of the level of spending which the government
finds acceptable.
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subsidy within such limits as it finds necessary.
If inflation is affecting the whole country, it should be possible
to raise the retail price of the subsidized foods without affecting
the real benefits to consumers.
A second condition for a successful program of subsidized
food distribution is that there must be means of limiting the quantity
demanded. As long as a commodity is sold at a price below that on
the unregulated market, demand for that product will exceed the
supply. If no control is placed on the amount distributed, the
government will be forced to procure ever-increasing quantities at
ever -higher prices, once again causing prohibitive levels of
cost. Such a situation occurred with the Egyptian subsidy on wheat
and bread, which could not be maintained due to excessive costs.
It would appear that subsidized distribution must be integrated into
a rationing system in order to be viable. The ration should be set
high enough to make a substantial nutritional contribution, but not
so high as to encourage wasteful consumption.
A third criterion for a program which subsidizes food consumption
is the degree to which the subsidized commodities reach the target
group, that is, the poor population. A cost-effective program will
be one in which the market for the subsidized foods is differentiated
in such a way that only, or mostly the poor obtain them. In theory
this can be done administratively, by restricting eligibility for
-14-
the foods to those who qualify through a means test. Such a method
of targeting is difficult to put into practice in low-income
countries where wage and income records are not commonly kept
(making the administration of a means test a bureaucratic nightmare)
and where regulations are easily circumvented by those with some
influence. However, much the same effect can be achieved by selecting
for subsidy foods which are automatically chosen by the low-income
30population and rejected by the relatively wealthy consumer. If
the foods which are subsidized are considered inferior, even though
they are wholesome and nutritionally valuable, then the desired
targeting should take place by consumer self-selection, without the
use of a cumbersome and costly bureaucratic structure. Futhermore,
it is our hypothesis that general price subsidies are potentially
acceptable in large part because their benefits are available to all
income groups, rather than being confined to the poor. In Pakistan,pre-
ground, whole wheat flour, made in part from imported wheat is the
product which is subsidized. All of these characteristics render
it less desirable than wheat and flour available on the open market,
and so the subsidized flour is consumed disproportionately by the
target group.
The final condition for a consumer subsidy program is that
procurement and distribution of the subsidized commodity take place
without depressing the overall level of prices received by farmers.
It may be argued that, if some fraction of the supply of a food is
-15-
sold at below-market price, and particularly if additional supplies
are brought in from abroad and sold at this low price, the price
of the open-market supply will be driven down, since the residual
quantity demanded will be reduced. This would not be the case,
however, if the subsidized food were differentiated as described
above. If the subsidized product is inferior, due to its
processing,packaging, or even simply due to the fact that it is
subsidized, then the demand--- emanating from a different group in the
population-- for the superior, free market varieties should
remain relatively unaltered. Furthermore, the superior varieties
are consumed by the economically more advantaged population, whose
demand is relatively quite inelastic with respect to price. Therefore,
farmers and retailers should be able to raise the price for these
varieties in order to compensate themselvesfor the smaller total
size of the market for their product. There is no inherent reason
why domestic procurement for a subsidized food consumption program
must necessarily take place at prices too low to compensate farmers
for their costs and labor. Such price-restraining mechanisms as
restrictions on grain trade between surplus and deficit areas of a
country, used in some countries which have food subsidies, are not an
integral part of the concept of a food subsidy. Even if some fraction
of total output is procured at low prices, however, it should be
possible for farmers to make up for their losses by charging higher
prices for the remainder. In this way, the relatively wealthier population
-16-
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contributes to the subsidyfor the Qonsumption of the poor,
and the conflict between maintainance of high producer prices and
implementation of low consumer prices is to some extent resolved.
-17-
II. THE RATION SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN: DESCRIPTION
The Government of Pakistan operates a network of shops through-
out the country which are outlets for two commodities: whole-meal
atta (100% extraction flour), and refined white sugar. It is the
distribution of atta with which we will be concerned in this
discussion. In the case of sugar, the program acts simply as a
rationing mechanism to ensure equitable distribution of a scarce
commodity: there is no direct subsidy on the price of sugar. The
Government is a monopoly trader, and controls prices from producer
to consumer. The consumer price of sugar is set at a level which
will cover the Government's costs. The high black market price is
due to the small supply available outside Government-controlled
channels, and does not reflect the price paid to producers. Furthermore,
sugar, far from being an inferior good, is a luxury commodity with a
high income elasticity of demand among all income groups. Atta distribution
on the other hand, fulfills most of the conditions we have posed for
an effective and viable food price subsidy program. While the size
of the ration is fixed, the retail price is not, so that the Government
can exercise control over the total cost of the program. The ration atta
itself is an inferior good, both because it is preground and therefore
subject to adulteration, and because it is made partly from imported
wheat which is not preferred by Pakistani consumers. Since the quality
of the atta is poor, the program achieves some degree of targeting
-18-
toward the needy without administrative imposition of a means
test. Another effect of the poor quality is that the market
for wheat and wheat flour is clearly differentiated, permitting
producers and retailers to charge a premium for the non-rationed
products.
The ration system did not originate as a nutrition intervention
or as a mechanism for income redistribution. The benefits of the
program are available to everyone; even if the wealthy choose not
to purchase the atta, they know the option is open to them. The fact
that ration shops are also the outlet for sugar is probably an
additional source of strength. The program therefore is not
perceived as an obvious income transfer.* Meanwhile, a large proportion
of Pakistan's urban population has become dependent on ration atta,
so that politically, it would be exceedingly difficult to dismantle
the program.
History of the Ration System
The history of the ration shop system reflects the development
of Pakistan's agricultural price policy. The first ration system was
in fact established before Pakistan became an independent nation:
it was created by the British in 1942 as a short term response to
an acute shortage of goods due to wartime disruption of trade and
diversion of domestic resources. At that time, wheat was distributed
through specially licensed retail outlets at the rate of six chattaks
This is as likely to be a political advantage in Pakistan as in the
U.S., where the Family Assitance Plan was defeated in the Congress
the same year that the Food Stamp Program was expanded to give
benefits greater than those which the straight income maintenance
program would have provided.
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(12 ounces) per person per day, and sugar, tea, matches, kerosene,
yarn and cloth were also available through ration shops,
After Partition in 1947, the rationing system was continued
in order to control the hoarding and profiteering on goods still
scarce as a result of the war.3 2 However, between 1947 and 1950,
there was no shortage of foodgrains. Wheat prices fell, and the
government abandoned rationing, although the statute permitting it
remained in effect. At the same time, a minimum support price was
established to benefit farmers. In 1950, floods reduced the supply
of wheat, and the Government once again imposed rationing and
subsidized consumer prices through the ration shops. During
the fifties, the price and supply situation fluctuated, as did the
Government's procurement activities. Throughout this period, the
Government of Pakistan maintained monopoly control of foodgrain
marketing. All grain which was marketed had to be sold to licensed
commission agents at a fixed price which was set by the Central
Government before the sowing season. The government then purchased
what it required for supply to the ration shops and for its other
needs, paying the set price plus about 18% for incidental expenses
and agents' commissions. The Government absorbed the cost of this
margin, and sold the wheat to flour mills at the procurement price.
In some years, all the wheat on the market was purchased by the
Government. Movement of grain within the country was strictly
controlled: no wheat could cross Provicial boundaries except on
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Government account. Export of wheat was prohibited. All of these
restrictions depressed the price which farmers received for their
grains, and thus reduced the incentive to increase production.
Domestic production did not keep pace with population growth during
the decade, and imports were required in order to prevent a reduction
in average per capita availability of grain. The U.S. started
sending wheat to Pakistan under P.L. 480 in 1956. This wheat was
used to help maintain low consumer prices by means of distribution
through the ration shop system and through the open market.
In 1959-60, the Government shifted to a positive price policy. It also
instituted free trade in grain in order to encourage production.
The support price of wheat was raised from Rs.12.50 to Rs. 13.50 per
maund (82 pounds)*, and compulsory sales as well as restrictions on
movement of grains within the country were abolished. A price
stabilization policy was adopted, whereby the Government would purchase
all the grain voluntarily offered by producers at the minimum support
price. Government stocks of grain would be released on the market
if the price rose above the maximum set by the Government, which was
Rs. 16.00 per maund in 1960-61. The purpose of this policy was to
provide incentives to farmers for increased production and to aid
industry by reducing fluctuations in the price of the key wage good. 3 3
At the same time, statutory rationing was abolished. Nonetheless, the
The Pakistani rupee, is worth (in 1975) about ten U.S. cents.
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ration system continued to operate, distributing atta and sugar.
During the early sixties, when supplies of wheat were significantly
increased, the differential between the free market price and the fixed
price was eliminated. Ration shops continued to distribute
atta, but with no limitation on the quantities to be purchased. They
simply functioned as outlets for the grain which the Government
continued to procure because of its guaranteed purchase policy. This
was the situation until the middle sixties, when two years of bad
weather as well as war with India disrupted domestic production.
At the same time, U.S. food aid was reduced. The support price of
wheat was raised to Rs. 17.00 per maund to encourage production, and
rationing of atta was reinstituted to deal with the scarcity. The
retail price of atta in the ration shops was manipulated in part
as a means of stabilizing free market prices.
Rationing of atta has continued up to the present. The Government
which came to power in December 1971 had an explicit policy of serving
the consumption needs of the population by means of price stabilization
and increased production. Procurement prices were raised from Rs. 17.00
to Rs. 22.50 per maund in 1972-73, and monopoly procurement was
reinstituted in some areas (e.g., Punjab). An attempt was made to
keep the wheat issue price to the mills at its earlier level (between
Rs. 17.00 and Rs. 18.00 per maund), but in 1973-74, the issue price
was raised to Rs. 21.50 per maund, while at the end of the year the
procurement price rose to Rs. 25.50 per maund in an attempt to raise
-22-
domestic production and reduce dependence on imports. This meant
that the Government subsidy on atta amounted to Rs, 4.00 per maund,
plus the cost of procurement. The price was held constant in 1974-75,
but raised in 1975-76 to Rs. 37.00 per maund for procurement, and to
Rs. 35.00 per maund for issue to the mills. Accordinglythe Government's
expenditure on the subsidy was reduced from Rs. 4.00 to Rs. 2.00 per
maund, a move which was necessitated in part by the increasing
financial burden of importing wheat at world prices. Distribution
of sugar has been a function of the ration shops since the Korean War.
Since 1972, the ration system has had a monopoly on trade in sugar.
In 1972-73, the system also was used to distribute vegetable oil,
which was in short supply. Oil is now sold in ordinary stores. In 1975,
atta sold at a retail price of Rs. 37.00 per maund (Rs.1.00 per kg.),
compared with an open market price of about Rs. 48.00 per maund
(Rs. 1.30 per kg.). Sugar costs Rs. 4.60 per kg. (about 2 pounds) in
the ration shops, while black market prices are reported to be
Rs. 8.00 to 10.00 per kg.
The Bhutto government also initiated a concern for what it
termed "consumption planning." This term implies that planning
to ensure a minimum level of consumption of basic necessities by all
population groups is as important as traditional production planning.
The already existing ration shop system was seen as a primary instrument
for the implementation of its consumption-oriented policies.
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Operation of the Ration, Sstem*
a) Administration
The ration shop system is operated primarily at the level
of the Provincial governments, The Central Government is responsible
only for allocating imported wheat to the provinces and other
Government departments, and for establishing general policy relating
to the shops. Policy issues which are centrally determined include
the procurement price of wheat from the farmers each year, the issue
price of wheat to the mills, and of flour from the mills to the ration
shops and to the consumers, the quantity of wheat to be procured
in each province, and the size of the ration allotment of atta and
sugar. Since October, 1974, the Central Government has also laid
down regulations to control the milling of atta for public distribution,
requiring mills to operate exclusively for the program, and to produce
only 100% whole meal atta. Prior to that time, milling regulations
were determined at the provincial level, and varied from one province
to another.
Details of the program's administrative structure are presented
in the Appendix.
* The information on which these sections and the appendix are based
came in part from personal observations by one of us (BLR) of ration
shops in Karachi, Lahore, and in the neighborhood of Rawalpindi, and
from visits to a procurement center and a flour mill in Punjab. These
visits involved informal conversations with ration shop customers and
owners, and with food program officials in one district of Punjab
These people appeared to speak freely, and did not seem hesitant to
discuss the program or their own experiences and attitudes. One
caveat should be applied, however: the data are derived almost
entirely from large cities and easily accessible rural areas; more
remote areas may present a different picture. We are presently
planning a more extensive study, using more formal methods of
data collection.
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b) Pricing
The procurement price of wheat is a matter of agricultural policy,
and is intended to be set high enough to encourage increases in
production by covering the costs of agricultural inputs, including
those required for modernization. As would be expected, establishment
of the price is subject to considerable political pressure, with
farmers moving to raise the price, and the urban population seeking
to lower it. In one year, the price was lowered from Rs. 17.00 to
Rs. 15.00 per maund for three months, after which farmers'protests
forced the price back to its original level. Since 1969, the rate
of inflation has been so high that procurement prices, announced as
support prices, have consistently been below open market prices at
the time of harvest.
Table I shows the procurement, issue and retail prices for ration
atta from 1968-69 to 1975-76. It shows that the rate of Government
subsidy (that is, the difference between the procurement and the issue
price) was only the cost of the procurement process until 1972-73.
In that year, the size of the subsidy increased to Rs. 5.50 per maund
and was then reduced to Rs. 4.00 in 1973-4, and to Rs. 2.00 in 1976-76.
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Table I: Procurement, Issue, and ret 1 prices for Ration Atta
(end of fiscal year; in rupees per maund)
Year Procurement Issue Retail
196-9 17 17 18,4
1969-70a 17 17 18.4
1970-la 17 17 18.4
1971-2b 17 17 18.4
1972-3c 22.5 17 18.4
1973-4c 25.5 21.5 22.9
1974-5 25.5 21.5 22.9
1975-6d 37 35 38
a. AID figures, Pakistan desk, Washington, D.C.
b. Pakistan Economic Survey 1971-2
c. AID Islamabad figures
d. Personal observation, September 1975
The mechanism by which the issue price is set could not be precisely
determined, but appears to be an ad hoc process based on the amount
of subsidy which the government considers feasible. The reduction
in subsidy in 1975-6 was the result of greatly increased costs in
the previous year. Imports of wheat were increased in that year due
to a poor crop in 1973-74, and imports were contracted at a time
when market wheat prices were high ($204 per ton). The total wheat
import bill for 1974-75 was Rs. 3,000 million, and according to the
Annual Plan for 1975-76, the issue price had to be raised in April, 1975
to offset this cost. 35
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This recent history indicates that ration shop consumers are not
completely protected from fluctuations in price due to yearly changes
in the supply situation, although the impact of market price changes
is mitigated by the subsidy, and seasonal variations are largely
eliminated.
c) Allotment
In urban areas, the allotment of atta is 1 3/4 kg. (3 pounds
15 ounces) per person per week for adults. The allotment for children under
14 years is half the ration, and no allotment is made for children under two.
According to one food official, the size of the ration is determined
by nutritional need, but it is not clear how such a determination
could be made, since the ration commodities do not provide a complete
diet. The ration of sugar is 1 kg. per person per month in urban
areas, and one quarter kg. in rural areas, with no reduction for
children.
In unusual circumstances, the ration may be reduced. For
example, in Tarbela Township, a resettlement town for people displaced
by the dam, the population has been growing so rapidly that supplies
can not be brought in fast enough, and shops have been distributing
half-rations of both sugar and atta. In the town of Haripur, in
N.W.F.P., the sugar ration was reported to be one kg. instead of 1 .
No explanation for this reduction was given.
The Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 1971-72' found
that in urban areas, average per capita consumption of wheat flour in
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a month ranged from 9.7 to 13.5 kg. per person, compared with
7.5 kg. available through the ration shops. This finding is consistent
with the common practice of supplementing the ration with wheat
purchased on the open market. However, a survey of grain consumption
37
habits in Karachi and Lahore conducted in 1974 tound that in the group
with household income below Rs. 250 per month (a group which constitutes
about 45% of the urban population), 66% of those interviewed in
Karachi, and 79% of those in Lahore purchased ration atta exclusively.
Tables II and III show the types of atta consumed by households in
different income groups in the two cities. This survey found that
a substantial proportion of the population in these cities is
dependent on ration shops for its atta. The increase in the real price
of flour on the open market since 1971 probably accounts for the
difference in findings between the Income and Expenditure Survey and
the later study.
d) Supply of Wheat to Ration System
Wheat is supplied to the ration shop system both through
government purchase of domestically produced grain and through imports.
Table IV shows the quantity of wheat for government operations which
was obtained fromdomestic procurement and from imports for 1973-4
and 1974-5, and the projected amounts for 1975-76.
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- a*
Table II; Source of Atta Consumed by Households in Lahore
Monthly House- Ration Open Self- Own
hold Income No. Depot Market Mix Ground Lands
Z. 250 275 79% 16% 1% 4% 2%
251-500 362 53% 38% 1% 12% 2%
501-700 161 36% 48% 1% 14% 3%
701-1500 166 16% 49% 1% 25% 10%
J 1500 36 6% 61% - 22% 11%
a. Source: Nasir-ud-Deen Associates, Roti Report
Table III: Source of Atta
Monthly House- Ration
hold Income No. Depot
Consumed by Households in Karachi a
Open Self-
Market Mix Ground
426 66% 8%4 250
i251-500 512 49% 19%
501-700 220 30% 22%
701-1500 215 26% 31%
>1500 102 34% 42%
a. Source: Nasir-ud-Deen Associates,
16% 11%
14% 19%
14% 35%
12% 32%
4% 20%
Roti Report
* Note: The percentages do not add to 100% because some respondents
purchase both open market and ration depot atta without mixing the
two. These are consumers who use the ration atta until it is
exhausted and then supplement it with open-market atta, and, as
would be expected, they fall mainly into the lower income groups.
Own
Lands
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Table IV: Source of Supply for Government Wheat Operationsa
(thousand tons)
Year: 1973-4 1974-5 1975-6b
Opening Stocks 86 96 237
Domestic Procurement 1320 1233 1100
Imports (adjusted for
crop year) 1040 1168 1432
Offtake 2175 2260 2415
a. Source: Annual Plan 1975-76
b. Projected
Government operations in wheat are not exclusively geared to
the ration system. Ration distribution constituted about 55% of
Government operations in wheat in 1974-75. The rest included free
distribution to consumers in Azad Kashmir and the Northern and
Centrally Administered Areas, supply to the military, and to
institutions such as schools and prisons. The ration system includes
the ration depots, which sell atta to private consumers at controlled
prices, and also covers retail establishmentssuch as bakeries, tandoors
(small bread-baking establishments), and restaurants which have applied
to the District Food Controller for permission to purchase ration atta.
1) Imports
In 1973-74, about 32% of wheat imports were on a commercial
basis, while the rest were credit sales and aid. The breakdown of
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imports by source for that year is shown in Table V. The quantity
of food aid from the United States has been subject to considerable
fluctuations, and has been falling off since 1972-3.
Imported wheat is not distributed evenly throughout the country,
because of the unequal cost of transportation to different areas.
Atta supplied to Karachi (the port) is more frequently made from
100% imported wheat than that supplied in other areas, and Karachi
virtually never receives atta made entirely from domestic wheat, as
does Punjab, for example.
Table V: Wheat Imports to Pakistan by Source, 1973-4
Source Quantity (tons)
PL 480 Title I 100,000
World Food Program Food Aid 269,000
U.S. C.C.C. Credit 171,000
Canada cash/credit 246,000
Cash Purchase from U.S. 362,000
Cash Purchase from Turkey 20,000
Total 1,168,000
a. Sourcc: Pakistan Economic Survey, 1974
Imported wheat is considered inferior by Pakistani consumers, because its
color is darker and it has somewhat different taste and baking properties
from domestic wheat.*
* This is one factor which makes ration atta poor in quality from
the consumer's point of view, and contributes to the targeting of
the program.
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2) Domestic Procurement
Due to poor crop yields in the past three years, domestically
produced wheat has been a declining proportion of Government
operations and the absolute quantity procured has followed a similar
trend, while the amount procured has constituted an increasing
proportion of total domestic output. Table VI shows the quantity of
wheat domestically procured since 1971-72, and the percentage it
represents of domestic production, and of total Government procurement
38
in that year.
Table VI: Procurment of Domestic Wheat for Government Operations
Year Quantity Procured % Production % Gov't Opera-
(tons) tions
1971-2 828,000 13 63
1972-3a 205,000 3 12
1973-4b 1,320,000 16 56
1974-5b 1,233,000 18 51
1975-6 b, 1,100,000 19 43
a. Pakistan Economic Surveys
b. Annual Plan 1975-6
c. Projected
It is the policy of the Food Departments in both Sind and Punjab
that grain may not move out of the province, or from surplus to deficit
districts within the province, except on government account.
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This policy enables the Food Department to purchase domestic wheat
at relatively low prices in surplus areas and distribute it through
the ration shops in deficit areas at lower cost than would be possible
in a free market, thereby reducing its costs. One
unfortunate result of this policy is that it lowers farm prices
and thus reduces the incentive for greater production in those areas
which have the highest agricultural production potential. The
extent to which movement restrictions are circumvented by smuggling
or black market operations was not investigated.
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III. THE RATION SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN: ANALYSIS
Nutritional and Economic Impact of the Ration System on Consumers
The ration system at present distributes only two commodities:
sugar and atta. The atta ration of 0.25 kg. (8 ounces) per person
per day, if it is all purchased and consumed, provides 770 calories
39*
and 27 grams of protein. This is enough to fulfill 25% of the
recommended intake of calories and 72% of the recommended protein
intake recommended for an adult man, or 38% of the calorie and 93%
40 **
of the protein intake recommended for an adult woman. In this dicussion,
*It should be remembered that, even though atta can supply a high
percentage of the protein requirements for an individual, wheat
by itself is an inadequate source of protein because of its incomplete
amino acid structure, and the diet would have to include some protein
complement such as a pulse, or some animal protein, in order to
satisfy dietary protein requirements. Accordingly, these protein figures
can be misleading.
**The subject of minimum requirements and recommended allowances of
nutrients is a source of continuing discussion and controversy among
nutritionists, and it must be recognized that at present there is
no one universally accepted set of values for nutrient intake require-
ments. The values we have used in our calculations are the WHO
estimates of recommended calorie and protein intake for a reference
man and woman of moderate physical activity. This is the activity
level most likely to apply to urban residents. These values are
almost certainly high, since they are calculated to provide a margin
of safety for the population. FAO has derived regional estimates
of per capita calorie requirements based on the age and sex distribution
and physical size of the population in different regions of the world
The daily calorie requirement per capita for Asia is estimated at
2210 . calories. If we had used this figure as the basis for our
computations, we would have found that the calorie supplement provided
by the ration atta constituted 14.25% of requirements for the Rs. 50-99
income class and 11.81% of requirements for the income class of
Rs. 200-249. Given the degree of individual variation which exists,
any specific figure which represents nutrient requirements or the
contribution of a particular food must be viewed as an approximation.
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we will not consider at any length the nutritional impact of sugar
distribution, since the rationing of sugar does not involve a
subsidy . and is not intended to raise nutritional levels, but
rather serves to ensure wide distribution and availability of the
commodity, and to prevent hoarding and profiteering. Furthermore,
sugar consumption, according to the 1971-72 Household Income and
Expenditure Survey, was well below the ration quota of 1 kg. per
person per month in the cities for all income groups up to Rs. 750
per month, that is, for 93% of the population. In rural areas, the
sugar quota is one quarter kg. per person per month, an amount which
can make only negligible caloric contribution to the diet, and
which in any case is more than consumers in the lower income half
of the rural population could purchase in 1971-72. Sugar prices have
risen by 150% since the survey was taken, while average income has
risen by only 82%, so it is likely that consumption among lower
income groups has declined, if anything, especially since refined
sugar is a luxury commodity with a high income elasticity of demand
in the lower income population, and there are readily available
cheaper substitutes (gur and shakkar) on the market.
By the same reasoning, the consumption of ration atta has
probably increased in the past five years. Prices of both ration
and open market atta have increased sharply since 1971-72, Ration
atta has gone from Rs. 18.40 per maund to Rs. 37.51, an increase of
104%, and open market atta has risen from about Rs. 20.00 to Rs, 48.00
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and higher,42 an increase of at least 128%. In response to declining
real income, consumers tend not only to reduce the quantity of most
items consumed, but also to turn to cheaper,lower-quality varieties,
This highly elastic demand for quality is most strongly evident in the
middle income group (Rs. 250-299, the interval which contains the
median household income for the population), but is also evident
43
among the poor (Rs. 50-99). Since ration atta is lower in price
and generally believed to be poor in quality, reliance on ration
atta in the middle and low-income population has probably increased
during the past five years.
The nutritional impact of the ration program is determined by
the amount of additional nutrient intake made possible by the price
subsidy, beyond what would be purchased at the free market price.
Of course, the free market price of wheat and wheat products will
be higher in the presence of a divided market, due to Government
procurement for the ration shops, than it would be if there were
no ration program. The true value of the subsidy would be measured
by the difference between the subsidized price and the hypothetical
market price in the absence of Government intervention. For the purposes
of this paper, and recognizing the inaccuracy involved, we are using
the existing open market price of whole-meal atta as the basis for
calculating ration program benefits, since calculation of a hypothetical
price would require complex econometric analysis and almost certainly would
yield no greater accuracy, given the uncertainties involved.
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If one makes the assumption that, for some consumers, the
amount of money available for atta consumption is fixed, so that
any increase in the price of atta requires a proportional decrease
in consumption, then the nutritional contribution of the ration
program is exactly equal to the proportion by which its price of
*
atta is lower than that on the open market. In September, 1975,
the price differential for atta was about one third, so by the above
assumption, individuals who purchased their entire ration would
receive a daily supplement equal to one third of the nutritional
contribution of the atta, or 254 calories and nine grams of protein
(8.6% of calorie and 24% of protein requirements for an adult male),
which they would not have received had they paid the open market
price.
Two factors are critical in determining the extent of nutritional
benefit received by consumers of a subsizided commodity. One is the
price elasticity of demand for the food; the other is the cross
elasticity of demand for other items, i.e., the way in which consumers
spend the income increment represented by the subsidy if they do not
use it all in purchasing the subsidized commodity. If the price
elasticity of demand is high, then a relatively small decrease in
price due to a subsidy will result in a disproportionately
We would expect this assumption to be largely applicable to the
lower income classes for whom purchasing power is the major constraint
on consumption. In the lowest income groups, the nutritional con-
tribution of the ration may be greater than we have calculated since
consumers might divert more of their income to the commodity as it
becomes a "better buy." In higher income groups, where the price
elasticity of demand for food is close to zero, the actual nutritional
contribution of the subsidy on atta is probably nil.
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large increase in the consumption of that commodity. If the cross
elasticity of demand for other goods is high, then as the price of
a commodity such as atta is lowered, consumers will not increase
the quantity they purchase, but will use the money freed up by the
lower price to purchase other goods instead. In this case ,as in
the earlier one, a price subsidy would have the effect of an income
supplement, but its nutritional impact would depend on the extent
to which consumers use the supplement to purchase more food. Such
behavior is, in large part, a function of income, the poor having
a higher price elasticity of demand for food. When the price of a
food staple such as ration quality atta falls, the lowest income
groups are likely to increase their consumption of the commodity
unless there are readily available, preferred substitutes which
are price-competitive.
Reliable estimates for the price elasticity of demand for
atta among different income groups in Pakistan do not exist. However,
expenditure elasticities for wheat and wheat flour have been calculated
by McCarthy for three income classes. These are shown in Table VII
below.
Table VII: Expenditure Elasticity of Demand for Wheat in Pakistan
Income Group* Rs. 50-99 Rs. 250-299 Rs. 1000-1499
Elasticity 2.8 .37 -. 65
* The low income group is in the bottom 2% of urban population, the
middle income group represents about the median urban income, and
the high group is in the top 2%.
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Expenditure elasticities approximate income elasticities of demand.
These tend to approximate price elasticities in cases where the commodity
in question represents a substantial proportion of the household budget.
Wheat purchases account for 32% of the household expenditure of the
low-income group shown in the table, 24.2% of that of the middle income
group, and 13% for those of high income.45 Therefore it may be assumed
that, at least for the lower two groups, these expenditure elasticities
reflect at least the order of magnitude of the price elasticities
of demand. These values were calculated for the whole class of wheat
and wheat flour, which includes a range of commodities of varying
quality. Since the demand for quality also varies with price and
income, it is likely that the demand elasticities for ration atta
alone are higher than for wheat flour as a class, particularly for
the middle and low income groups.
The effectiveness of a nutrition intervention may be measured first,
by the magnitude of its benefits, and second, by the extent
to which those benefits reach all or most members of the target group,
and do not reach those outside it. A nutrition intervention ideally
should reach a high proportion of the target group, while excluding,
46
to the extent possible, all others, in order to economize on resources.
Of course, the definition of the target group is critical in evaluating
the effectiveness of a subsidy. If one defines the entire lower half
of the population as needy, then the program will have a higher cost-
effectiveness than if only the bottom ten percent are included
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in the target. An up-to-date survey of nutritional intake in
Pakistan would identify income groups whose diets are deficient
and thus empirically define the target group, In the absence of such
information, we have arbitrarily considered as needy all those whose
incomes fall below Rs. 250, or about 45% of the population, In the
case of a price subsidy, McCarthy has posed a set of criteria for
selecting the food to be subsidized in order to maximize the
effectiveness of the subsidy in reaching the low-income population.
These criteria include: 1) a high fraction of total consumption
of the food by the poor; 2) a high price and income elasticity of
demand for the food among the poor and 3) low or negative elasticities
among the more well-to-do. Atta fits these criteria fairly well,
and ration shop atta, due to its inferior quality, fits them even
better. As a result, ration shop distribution of atta should be
effectively targeted to the poor, and available evidence indicates
that this is the case.
48,
The Roti Report survey asked consumers in Karachi and Lahore
where they purchased their atta. As shown in the first column of
Table VII, the percentage of respondents who reported purchasing atta
from ration shops declined with increasing income. The same table
shows the percentage of all ration shop users who are drawn from
each income class of the population, and the proportion which
this is of. their percentage representation in the population as
a whole. Thus in Lahore, of the income class from Rs. 0-250 per month
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( a class which represents 45% of the urban population), 79%
reported purchasing ration shop atta. This class comprised 59%
of all ration shop users, and its representation among ration
shop users is 1.31 times its representation in the population as
a whole. The top 1,8% of the population, with household incomes
above Rs. 1500, represented only 0,2% of ration shop users.
In Lahore, 97% of ration shop users were drawn from the lower
85% of the population, an indication that the targeting of the
program toward the needy is reasonably effective. The same targeting
is seen in the Karachi data, althoughthe effect is not so sharply
drawn. The overall participation rate in Lahore is 60.4% and in
Karachi it is 53.4%. This is consistent with the fact that ration
shop atta is considered poorer quality in Karachi than in Lahore,
because of the higher proportion of imported wheat it contains.
Unfortunately, information has not been collected on the use
of ration shop atta among groups representing smaller sized income
intervals in the population. On the basis of existing information,
we can infer that as household income decreases, the rate of participation
in ration shop atta distribution rises. However, there is no empirical
basis for estimating participation rates among the bottom 3% of
the population (income below Rs. 100) or the bottom 13% (income, below
Rs. 150). It is possible to create a curve for participation in the
ration atta program as a function of household income, using the Roti
survey figures as estimates of participation at the midpoint of each
Table VIII: Ration Shop Use by Income Class in Karachi and Lahore
Lahore
Monthly Percent of
Household Urban Pop-
Income
(Rs.)
0 -250
250-500
500-700
700-1500
1500
ulation
44.9%
39.2%
8.6%
5.5%
1.8%
% Using % Users in
Ration Income
Atta
79%
53%
36%
16%
6%
Group
59.0%
34.0%
5.0%
1.5%
0.2%
Proportion
of Repre-
sentation in
PoDulation
1.31
.86
.58
.27%
.09%
Karachi
% Using % Users
Ration Income
At ta
66%
49%
30%
26%
34%
in
Group
55.4%
36.0%
4.9%
2.6%
1.1%
Proportion
of Repre-
sentation in
Population
1.23
.92
,57
.,47
.61
-i
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income class.* This curve projects a participation rate of 100% among
the lowest income groups (Rs. 0-50 per month). It is not known
whether mobility, the lack of a fixed address, fear of the
bureaucracy, or sheer discriiiination might deter the very poorest
membersof society from purchasing ration shop atta, and thus reduce
the level of participation. This is one of several aspects of the
program which still require empirical investigation. In the following
discussion, we have made the assumption that the maximum participation
rate is 90%, and we have interpolated participation rates for smaller
income intervals accordingly.
In order to estimate the nutritional benefit from ration atta
distribution received by persons in each income class, we took the
average household consumption of wheat and wheat flour from the
1971-72 Household Income and Expenditure Survey.** In view of the
increase in the real prices of food and other commodities since that
time, this quantity probably overstates the present level of consumption.
We multiplied this quantity by the participation rate of the income
groups, making the (rather heroic) assumption that the proportion of
the income group which uses ration atta might reflect the proportion
of ration atta in the wheat consumption of that group. Making the
further assumption that all of a household's atta is evenly distributed
* Midpoints were calculated by breaking the class into smaller intervals
and weighting each by its percentage representation in the urban
population. Data for Lahore were used.
This was average per capita consumption multiplied by the number of
household members. No adjustment for children was made in the survey,
and so we made none in reversing the calculation.
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among the members,* we then divided by the average number of
household members to obtain an estimate of the amount of ration
atta consumed by an individual in a month. The amount which may
be considered a supplement was calculated at one third of the total,
that is, the proportional difference in price between open market
and ration atta. The results of these calculations are presented
in Table IX. In this table, no adjustment was made for the number
of wage earners per household, as was done for the subsequent table,
since here we are concerned with the effect of the program on the
individual, not on the family unit. It will be noticed that for
the target low income groups (those under Rs. 250), average per
capita consumption of ration atta calculated in this manner exceeds
the allotment of 7.5 kg., even without considering the reduction
for minors and infants. This is one indication that wheat and
flour consumption must in fact, have declined between 1971-2,
* This is the assumption made in the Income and Expenditure Survey,
and for these purposes it is an assumption we are forced to make,
since we have no information about the number of children per
household in different income classes. We do know that a larger
proportion of family members are children in upper income families--
a condition which, incidentally, should tend to reduce the available
per capita benefit of ration atta in these higher income groups.
We also know that children consume smaller quantities of food than
adults. Depending on their age and rate of growth, children's
absolute requirements for calories and protein are lower than those
of adults although they are higher per kilogram of body weight.
While it is usually assumed that the consumption levels of children
are more deficient than those of adults in the same family, a detailed
study of intra-family food distribution patterns would be needed to
determine the likely distribution of atta under varying income and
price conditions.
Table IX: Nutritional Benefit from Ration Atta by Income Class
Monthly Number of % Parti- Monthly Daily Sup- % of Recommended Daily Sup-
Household Members cipation Consump- plementary calorie intake plementary
in House-
Hold
tion (kg.) Calories Male Female Protein
(grams)
% of Recommended
Protein Intake
4ale Female
50-99 2.6
100-149 3.7
150-199 4.4
200-249 5.1
250-299
85 9.20
(7.50)
82 9.64
(7.50)
79 8.57
(7.50)
70 7.64
(7.50)
62 7.01
52 5.44
47 5.01
36 3.58
24 2.48
12 1.29
5.9
300-399 6.6
400-499 7.5
500-749 8.5
750-999 8.7
1000-1499
1499-1999
>2000
8.5
8.1
8.6
6
4
.58
.39
315
(254)
330
(254)
293
(254)
261
(254)
240
186
171
122
85
44
10.5 14.3
(8.6) (11.5)
11.0 15.0
(8.6) (11.5)
9.8 13.3
(8,6) (11.5)
8.7 11.9
(8.6) (11.5)
8.0
6.2
5.7
4.1
2.8
1.5
20
13
10.9
8.5
7.8
5.5
3.9
2.0
.7 0.9
.4 0.6
11.0
(9.0)
11.5
(9.0)
10.2
(9.0)
9.1
(9.0)
8.4
6.5
6.0
4.3
3.0
1.5
.7
.5
30.0 37.9
(24.0) (31.0)
31.0 39.7
(24.0) (31.0)
27.6 35.2
(24.0) (31.0)
24.6 31.4
(24.0) (31.0)
22.7
17.6
16.2
11.6
8.1
4.1
1.9
1.4
29.0
22.4
20.7
14.8
10.3
5.2
2.4
1.7
Income
(Rs.)
p.
p.
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when the household consumption estimates were made, and 1974-5,
when the ration shop participation data were collected, If we assume
that 7.5 kg. per month is an absolute limit on ration atta purchases,
then for groups whose estimated monthly per capita consumption
exceeds the quota of ration atta, the amount of the quota (7.5 kg.)
should be substituted. In this case, the nutritional supplement
would be one third of the protein and calories in this amount of
atta, or 9 grams of protein and 254 calories, amounting to 24%
of the protein and 8.6% of the calorie requirement for an adult
male. These figures have been inserted in Table IX in parentheses
for comparison. In view of the widespread use of bogus ration cards,
and given the practice by some ration shop owners of selling to
needy consumers the atta unclaimed by other card-holders, it is
possible that some households are in fact able to purchase quantities
larger than the quota. Nonetheless, it is likely that this table
somewhat over-estimates ration atta consumption in the lower income
groups whose consumption
is most likely to have been reduced by the rise in real food prices.
On the other hand, the estimated nutritional contribution of the atta
is based on the WHO determination of the requirements of an adult
male. More than half the population consuming ration atta consists
of women and children whose absolute needs (except in the case of
pregnant and lactating women) are lower, so that the atta would make
a proportionally greater contribution to their protein and calorie
requirements.
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One way to check the accuracy of the estimates is to compare
the amount of atta which would be distributed based on these assumptions
with the quantity actually distributed. Assuming that 30% of the population
lives in urban areas covered by the ration program, the amount of
atta distributed in a year based on the estimates used in the table
would be 1,549,236 tons. Imposing a per capita limit of 7.5 kg. per
month on ration atta consumption reduces this estimate to 1,440,300
tons. Aproximately 40% of the population of Pakistan is under the
age of 14, and therefore would receive half the quota of atta.
Assuming an equal distribution of minors among ration system users,
and subtracting half the allotment of 40% of these users, we obtain
an estimated total yearly distribution of ration atta of 1,152,240 tons.
The actual quantity distributed in 1974-75 was 1,239,240 tons. Thus
the estimates used in the tables probably overstate- by about one
sixth the total quantity of ration atta distributed. Much of this
overestimate would be accounted for by the reduction for minors,
which would affect all income classes, but which might not affect the
estimates for nutritional contribution, since the nutritional requirements
for minors are lower as well. The figures at least give an estimate of
the order of magnitude of the nutritional contribution of the ration
atta and the degree to which that benefit is targeted to the needy.
Using the same assumptions about participation rates and quantities
of ration atta consumed, Table X presents estimates of the income
contribution at different income levels represented by the subsidy on
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the price of ration atta. The amount of the subsidy has been calculated
in absolute terms and as a proportion of family income. As household
income increases, the number of members and the number of wage
earners in the household tend to rise. This means that income per
capita and income per nuclear family (assuming each nuclear family is
represented by a single wage earner) tend to rise less steeply than
income of the household as a whole. In order to take account of this
fact, the amount of subsidy has been calculated for the nuclear family,
as well as for the household. Estimates for the nuclear family have
been obtained by dividing both the household income (calculated at the
midpoint of the interval) and the amount of the subsidy (estimated at
one third the value of the ration atta purchased by the household)
by the number of wage earners in the household. If the assumption is
made that families can purchase only the 7.5 kg. per person allotment,
then the monetary benefit for households below Rs. 250 in income would
be as shown in parentheses in Table X. The amount of the subsidy
as a proportion of income declines with increasing income over the
whole range of income classes. While the absolute amount of the subsidy
to the household increases as household income rises to Rs. 299,
this is due to increasing household size. When correction is made
for the number of wage earners, the amount of the subsidy to the nuclear
family consistently declines with rising income, with the exception of
the lowest income class. Estimates for the income group Rs. 0-49, have
been omitted from these tables, because they are unreliable due to
Table X: Monthly Income Supplement from Ration Atta by Income
Monthly
Household % of Urban No. Wage Nuc. Fam. Nuc. Fam. Subsidy to
Income (Rs,) Yopulation Earners Members Income Household
50-99 2.7% 1.1 2.36 68 6.58
(5.35)
100-149
150-199
200-249
250-299
300-399
400-499
500-749
750-999
1000-1499
1500-2000
> 2000
10.15
15.5
16.5
12.6
17.7
8.9
8.9
2.9
1.3
.9
.9
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.6
1.6
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.0
1.7
3,09
3.38
3.64
3.69
4.13
3.95
4.25
4.35
4.05
4.05
5.06
104
134
161
172
219
237
312
412
595
875
1471
9.80
(7.61)
10.37
(9.05)
10.72
(10.50)
11.38
9.88
10.32
8.36
5.94
3.01
1.30
.92
Class
Subsidy to
Nuc. Fam.
Subsidy as
% of Income
4-
5.98
(4,87)
8.17
(6.34)
7.98
(6.96)
7.66
(7.50)
7.11
6.18
5.43
4.18
2.97
1.43
.65
.54
8.77
(7.13)
7.86
(6,09)
5.96
(5,17)
4.79
(4.67)
4.13
2.82
2.92
1.34
.72
.24
.07
.04
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the small number of respondents in this group in the Household Income
and Expenditure Suvey on which our consumption estimates are based,
In the income class of Rs. 50-99, the amount of the subsidy is low
both because of the small size of the family, and because their level
of ration atta consumption is low due to their low income. A price
subsidy is a form of income supplement which is available to individuals
only to the extent that they can spend money to take advantage of it.
In the case of ration atta,the.upper limit to the supplement is
theoretically the quota, but the lower limit is determined by the
willingness or ability to purchase the subsidized commodity,
and this may be limited in the case of the very poor. That is why it
is important to keep the price of such commodities low and to select
commodities which are normally consumed by the poor.
The calculations in Table X give a rough estimate of the income
benefits provided by the subsidy on ration atta, and indicate that
these benefits are skewed toward the lower end of the income scale.
In order to calculate accurately the net benefit of the program, one
would need additional information which is presently unavailable. First,
since government intervention (procurement and rationing) has some
inflationary effect on open market prices, an estimate would be needed
of the difference between the open market price of atta and the hypothetical
price in the absence of the program. One could then use household
consumption data to determine where the burden of the higher price fell.
Clearly it would fall most heavily on higher income groups who rely
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least on the ration shops and purchase larger quantitites of wheat
on the open market. A second factor in determining the net benefit
of the ration program is the tax structure, since the costs of the
program are covered by general revenues. Including this factor in
the estimate would further skew the benefits toward the poor since
income taxes are paid only by the top four percent of the urban
population and the tax rates are progressive. In addition, the
burden of other national sources of revenue would also have to be
taken into account: tariffs, export taxes, charges for Government
services, and other levies. The determination of who pays and how
much they pay for the program would be made by calculating the cost
of the program to each income group and subtracting the benefits obtained
through use of the system. Such benefits could accrue either directly
by consumption of the ration atta, or indirectly, for example, if
the existence of the ration system has a depressing effect on wages
paid to employees. In the latter case, of course, such an effect
would also have to be taken into account in calculating the net benefit
to the employee.
While the lower income groups clearly receive a larger porportional
income benefit from ration atta distribution than do the relatively
better off, there remains a large percentage of the total benefit which
is reaching the non-needy, Thirty-eight per cent of the income benefits
from the program (shown in Table X) reach the 42.5% of the population
the household incomes above Rs. 300. The contribution which these
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benefits make is negligible in terms of the income of the group,
but it represents a large proportion of the total benefit derived
from the program, and as such, may be considered a misallocation of
resources. The question which must be asked, however, is whether
any alternative program could reach the same number of low-income
consumers and make anequivalent nutritional contribution while
excluding the participation of the non-needy. Given the considerable
administrative difficulty of targeting programs through means testing*
and the relative ease of circumventing such regulations, the answer
is probably no. It is more effective , and certainly more politically
advantageous, to reduce the incentive to participate among the well-to-do
rather than to seek to exclude them by bureaucratic methods.
Cost of the Ration System
The monetary value of the income increment received by the consumer
of ration atta is determined by the amount purchased and by the difference
between the open-market and the controlled price. The cost to the
Government of operating the system to distribute ration atta is
determined by many factors other than the siz.e of the ration and its
price, and therefore there is no direct and consistent relationship
between the cost of the program and the monetary and nutritional
benefits which it provides. The Government controls some aspects of
its costs which affect the benefits of the program, but there are others,
such as the world market price of wheat, over which Pakistan has no
control. In this section we will discuss the various elements which
* Even in the U.S. with large scale welfare and social security systems
in operation and a relatively small percentage of eligible users, it costs
$1.00 to provide a recipient with 50 cents worth of food.
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contribute to the cost of the program, and we will explore -the relation-
ship between the program's cost and its benefits to participants. In
a later section, we will attempt to evaluate the changes in program
costs which would be likely to result from different program policies
and from alterations in the supply situation for wheat.
The Government of Pakistan depended on imported wheat for about
52% of its operations in 1974-75. The proportion of imported wheat
in government operations has risen in the past three years; it constituted
48% of the total distributed in 1973-74, and is projected to make up
50% of the 1975-76 total. It will be remembered that ration atta
distribution is only a part of these operations. Wheat is also provided
to the military and to Government-operated schools, hospitals and
prisons, and it is distributed free in the Northern and Centrally
Administered Areas and in Azad Kashmir. In 1974-75, ration distribution
accounted for 55% of Government wheat operations. For the purposes
of the present discussion, we will assume that all wheat which enters
the system is randomly distributed through the various programs, that
is, that 55% of imported wheat must go to ration shops, and 52% of
the wheat distributed through ration shops in 1974-75 must have been
imported.* The Government's expenditure on imported wheat for the
ration system is determined by the difference between the import price
which it must pay, and the issue price which it charges to the roller
flour mills. Of course, the expenditure is in scarce foreign exchange
It is likely that, in actualitya higher proportion of domestically
procured wheat is reserved for non-ration-shop-system operations,
since it is considered better quality, and other operations may
command a higher priority in receiving it.
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while the return is in domestic currency, The issue price is set
by the Government (and in turn determines the retail price of ration
atta), but the world market price, and hence the cost to the Government
of imported wheat is subject to wide fluctuations. For example, in
1973-74, the Government paid an average of $134 per ton for 1,168,000 tons
of wheat on the world market, In 1974-75, it paid $204 per ton for
1,566,000 tons. Implicit in these facts is the apparent determination
of the Central Government, stated explicitly in both the Annual Plan
1975-76 and the Pakistan Economic Surveys to maintain the quantity
of wheat available to the population, in spite of high world prices
or domestic production shortfalls. In view of this policy, it is impossible
to predict for any year what the cost will be of wheat imports for
the ration system, in order to budget for them. However, the high
cost of wheat in 1974-75 prompted the Government to raise the issue
price in August 1975, in order to reduce the total cost of the wheat
subsidy. The increase in issue price resulted in a retail price increase of
66% , bringing ration atta more closely in line with the general level
of consumer prices, which had been undergoing substantial inflation
since 1970-71. Such a move by the Government indicates that higher
priority is given to maintaining the quantity available through the
ration shops than to maintaining an : artifically low price level.
Since average per capita income increased by 95% in the same period
of time that ration atta rose in price by 104%, the impact of the price
increase was not as great as its magnitude might suggest. The distribution
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of the income increase is not known, however, and the impact of the
price change on ration atta consumption among the needy has not been
investigated.
The cost to the Government of domestically produced wheat is
equal to the difference between the procurement price paid to farmers
and the issue price to the mills. Table I, pg. 25, shows the procurement
price, the issue price and the ration shop retail price for atta.
since 1968-9. From 1968-9 to 1971-2, the procurement price and the
issue price were the same, so that the Government subsidy on domestic
wheat amounted only to the costof the procurement process: agents'
commissions and allowances for incidental expenses, plus administrative
costs. In 1972-3, the government attempted to maintain the issue
price while raising the procurement price by Rs. 5.50 per maund. The
following year, the size of the subsidy was reduced to Rs. 4.00, and for
1975-76 the subsidy was reduced to Rs. 2.00 per maund, as both procurement
and issue price were raised. Based on the 55% figure for ration
distribution as a fraction of Government wheat operations, the subsidy
cost of domestic wheat in 1974-75, at the rate of Rs. 4.00 per maund, came
to $7,341,652. The cost of imported wheat to the program, calculated
at 55% of total wheat imports, less the amount for which it was sold
at the issue price, was $125,606,170. The total cost of wheat for the
ration program in that year was $132,947,820, an amount equal to ten
49
percent of the nation's operating budget for that year,
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Another important item.of cost to the Government is the jute
bags in which the ration atta is transported, These bags are provided
new by the Government for each year Is supply of wheat, and they remain
with the ration shop owner to resell as part of his income. The
amount of ration atta distributed in 1974-5 would require more than
13 million bags. Before the separation of Bangladesh, bags were
provided by the then East Pakistan. Now they are imported from
Sri Lanka. At the present price of Rs. 7.00 each, the cost of bags
alone amounts to more than $9 million, or seven percent of the cost
of the wheat. The cost of salaries for personnel to administer the
program is another budget item, for which no estimate is available.
A conservative estimate for the total costof the program in 1974-75
would be $143 million, or about 10.8% of the Government's operating
budget. With the reduced size of the subsidy on domestic wheat, and
the reduced price of wheat on the world market, the program should
cost substantially less in 1975-6, even though the total size of the
program (as reflected by total government offtake) is increasing
(see Table IV).
Dependence on Food Aid
In 1972-73, the Government of Pakistan imported 1,263,000 tons
of wheat, an amount which constituted 76% of total procurement. Table V
shows the breakdown of imports by source for this and the subsequent
year. Of the 1972-3 imports, all but 50,000 tons, or only 3.3%, were
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obtained as food aid on credit at concessional terms. Seventy-six
percent of the imports came from the United States in the form of aid,
and much of the remainder came from multilateral agencies at least
part of whose supplies were donated by the U.S. In 1973-4, total
wheat imports declined to 1,168,000 tons, and the proportion of
concessional imports declined from 97% to 68%. The percent of
imports supplied as aid by the U.S. declined to 23% and an additional
30% was supplied by the U.S. on a commercial basis. The U.S. has
in the past three years reduced the quantity of food aid it has donated
and has hardened the terms of its loans for the purchase of food. The
possibility that food aid from the U.S. might be drastically reduced
or eliminated raises serious questions for a program whose dependence
on imports has been steadily increasing. In 1973-74, 44% of Government
operations in wheat (aside from the drawing down of stocks) were from
imports, and 68% of imports were on concessional terms. This means
that 30% of Government wheat distribution was from foreign assistance
sources. If the proportions are the same for the ration system, then
30% of its distribution represents food aid. In 1974-75, this would
have amounted to 371,775 tons of wheat.
If food aid were eliminated, the Government would have several
options. It could elect simply to reduce the size of the program by
reducing the ration. Judging by the Government's response to the high
wheat prices of 1974-75, this seems relatively unlikely, If such a
policy were adopted, the ration would in fact, have be cut by more
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than 30%, since certain other Government responsibilities, such as
military and institutional feeding, might have to be maintained at their
current level. A second option would be to make up the difference
by means of purchases from domestic suppliers. This would mean raising
1974-75 procurement by 371,000 tons, or about a third for the ration
system alone, raising the proportion of output procured to 23.4%.
Of course, the specific proportions would depend on the supply situation,
which varies from year to year. The cost of domestic procurement
would be less than the cost on paper of the imports, and it would
have the advantage of being payable in local currency. However, the
procurement price would probably have to be raised in order to call
forth these larger supplies, unless compulsory procurement were implemented.
Even if procurement were compulsory, higher prices might be necessary
in order to avoid a production disincentive. Furthermore, reduced
supplies of domestic wheat on the open market would result in higher
prices to the non-ration shop customer. This is not necessarily
undesirable. If consumntion by the needy is primarily through ration
shops, then, in effect, the relatively better-off consumers, purchasing
on the open market, would be further subsidizing, by the higher prices they
pay, the ration shop purchases of the low income population. At
the same time, however, the higher open market price might drive some
consumers to the ration shop for their supplies, thereby enlarging
the demand through the ration system.
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A third option would be for the Government to make up for lost
foreign aid by means of commercial purchases on the world market.
At February 1976 world prices (about $150 per ton), the quantity
of wheat lost to the ration system by the elimination of food aid
would cost $55.8 million, or about 3% of total imports by value in
1974-75. Once again, the Government would have to spend more in
order to maintain its other distribution programs as well. If world
market prices reached the levels of 1974, when wheat sold at $210
per ton, the cost would increase to $78.1 million. As was the case
in the earlier reduction of food aid, it is likely that the Government
would respond to further aid cutbacks in the forseeable future by increasing
its international commercial purchases more than domestic purchases,
and probably would not cut back its programs. Pakistan suffers
from a shortage of foreign exchange; it has been a net importer for
many years. It is, however, a nation which enjoys reasonably good
international credit because of the economic progress it has achieved
In addition, as traditional sources of loans have diminished, Pakistan
has been able to turn to the newly-rich oil-exporting countries of the
Middle East for assistance as a member of the Islamic League. In 1974-5,
51.4% of all foreign aid, a total of $896.1 million,came from Islamic
nations. In the same year, 50.5% of foreign aid went for commodity
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imports and balance of payments support. At least in the short
run then Pakistan is in a fortunate position in terms of having access
to funds to carry out its food assistance programs.
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Ration System Program Alternatives: Costs and Benefits
If the Government decided to increase the benefits provided
by the ration program, it could do so either by raising the size of
the ration, or by lowering its price, or both. If the size of the
ration were raised, with no change in price, presumably those who
are already purchasing less than the quota would continue to purchase
the same quantity as before, Since we have no empirical information
about individual household consumption of ration atta, we shall assume
that the proportion of consumers in each income class who now purchase the
ration would increase their purchases if they could do so. Since
this proportion is smaller for higher income classes, a relatively
smaller proportion of the marginal benefit of the increase in quota
size would go to the non-target group. Those who are now purchasing
the allowable limit of ration atta and who supplement it from the open
market could increase their total consumption of atta without raising
their expenditure, by diverting their purchases to the ration shop.
The nutritional benefit to this group would be proportional to the
increase in intake resulting from the switch to ration atta, an
amount equal to the proportional difference in price between ration
and open market atta, multiplied by the amount of the quota increase.
However, those households which presently purchase only ration atta,
and which in some cases cannot even purchase their entire allotment
because of limited resources, would not benefit at all from an increase
in the ration, although they are the neediest consumers, because they
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could not afford to purchase the entire ration. There are no data
available which would enable us to estimate the number of households
which fall into this group, but given that the bottom 3% of the population
appears, based on our earlier calculations, to derive less than the
maximum benefit from the ration atta, we will assume that this group
could not purchase an increased quantity without a price reduction.
Based on these assumptions, we have derived an estimate of the
increase in consumption which would result from raising the atta
allotment by one kilogram per person per month. Assuming again that
30% of Pakistan's population is urban, we calculated the number of
individuals in each income class, and the number who purchases ration
atta based on the participation data used earlier, and then
calculated the number of -minors (40%) who receive half rations. Based
on these calculations, an increase in the quota to 8.5 kg. per person
per month would result in an increase in total distribution of 108,774
tons per year, 8.8% higher than the amount c-onsumed in 1974-5. If this
quantity of wheat were obtained from imports, the cost at present
(1976) world prices would be $16.3 million. If the issue price remained
at Rs. 35 per maund, the total cost to the Government would be
$6.0 million. However, the expenditure of $16.3 million would be in
foreign exchange, while the return would be in local currency.
If the wheat were procured domestically, and
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if the amount of Government subsidy remained at Rs. 2.00 per maund,
the cost would be Rs. 5,829,243, equivalent to $588,812. In either
case, an additional 1.2 million jute bags would be needed at a cost
of about Rs. 8 million, or just over $0.8 million. Thus the cost
of raising the ration by one kilogram per person per month would be
about $7 million(or 5% of the present cost of the atta rationing
program)if wheat were imported and $1.4 million,(or about 1% of the
program's cost)if domestic wheat were used.
We have defined the target group here, for
nutritional purposes, as those households with income below
Rs. 250. The number of persons in the target group benefitting from
an increase in the atta allotment would be all those participants
with household incomes between Rs. 100 and Rs. 250, or 6.8 million
persons. The nutritional benefit received would be (by our earlier
assumptions) one third of the value of the additional kilogram, or
34 additional calories and 1.2 additional grams of protein per day.
The monetary benefit would be one third of the cost of a kilogram
of atta on the open market, or Rs. 0.4 per month. If the size of
ration were lowered by one kilogram, we may assume that all but the
poorest 3% of the population who purchase ration atta would reduce
their consumption by that amount. This would mean a reduction in
consumption equivalent to the increase discussed above of 108,774 tons
per year, and the cost reduction would be equivalent to the increase
in costs discussed above.
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If the price of the ration were lowered, with no change in
the allotment, then the small percentage of people who are presently
unable to purchase their entire allotment would certainly receive
a nutritional supplement, since this group has a high price elasticity
of demand for atta, and would take advantage of the lower price to
increase the quantity purchased up to the maximum allowed. It is
expected that this group is small since even the second lowest income
group (Rs. 50-99) reported spending Rs. 16.00 per month on wheat
flour in 1971-72, an amount sufficient to cover the atta ration
for a family averaging 2.6 members, with an average of 40% of its
members being minors. More realistically, a family of three with
one child would be entitled to purchase 18.75 kg of atta per month,
at a cost of Rs. 17.81. It should be remembered that, with inflation,
the household reporting these purchases in 1971-72 should have increased
its money income by 82%, so that presumably the total expenditure
on wheat and wheat flour has also increased. Lowering the 'price of
the ration would provide a real income supplement to all ration shop
users in proportion to the amount of atta they purchase. As indicated
earlier the nutritional benefit of the income supplment. would be greatest
in the lowest income classes. However, a certain amount of "leakage',
that is, expenditure on non-food items or on increases in quality
rather than quantity would be expected with an income supplement which
would not occur if the supplement were in the form of food. Furthermore,
a lower price would enable only those who were presently purchasing
-63-
less than their allotment to increase their purchases of ration
atta. All others would have to turn to the open market and pay
higher prices for the atta they consumed.
In order to lower the retail price of ration atta by Rs. 0.10
per kg., the Government would have to lower the issue price to the
mills by the same amount, that is, by Rs. 4.00 per maund. The cost
of all wheat to the Government, imported and domestic, would go up
by this amount, raising the total cost of wheat distributed by
$13.4 million, or an additional ten percent of the cost of wheat
for the programin 1974-5 (one percent of the Government's annual
operating budget). In addition, perhaps three percent of the
population might increase their purchase of atta up to the limit.
If the entire urban population with incomes under Rs. 100
now participating in the ration program purchased an additional
one kilogram of atta per month, with minors purchasing half a kilogram,
the increase in total distribution would be 4675 tons per year, less
than 0.4% of the amount distributed in 1974-5, adding a negligible
amount to the total cost of the program. Raising the retail price
of the atta by raising the issue price would, presumably, lower
Government costs to a comparable extent. The relative advantages and
disadvantages of the two options would depend on the characteristics
of the consumer population. If the percentage of consumers who cannot
afford the whole ration is high, it might be advisable to
lower the price, although the leakages would be high. Increasing the
size of the ration would provide minimal benefit increases to the wealthy
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but it probably would not benefit the poorest consumers either.
Empirical evidence would be needed to determine which alteration would
be preferable.
There are several other possibilities for increasing the nutritional
contribution of the ration system. One such option is to expand the
variety of foods available through the system at controlled prices,
being careful to select foods which meet the criteria outlined earlier
in this report. A food which is probably even more appropriate than
atta for subsidized distribution is gram, or chick-pea, which is consumed
51
in Pakistan indclining amounts with rising income. McCarthy holds
that gram is more suitable to a price subsidy than wheat, since a
disporportional amount is consumed by the low-income (under Rs. 250)
group, and the price elasticity of demand (expenditure) by this group
is higher than for wheat (1.95, compared with 1.6 for wheat). The
potential nutritional contribution of gram is significant, since gram
is a pulse, which contains protein complementary to that of wheat
and other grains. This means that if gram is consumed with wheat, the
value of the protein in both foods is enhanced.*
Another food which might be distributed through the ration system,
either free or at a subsidized price, is a weaning food: a high protein
and high calorie beverage or gruel designed to meet the nutritional
needs of young children during the critical weaning period, usually
falling between the ages of 6 and 24 months. Similar foods donated
by international aid agencies have been distributed in Pakistan
*Fodswhich meet other criteria for subsidz ation~but are not nutritionally
valuable often can be fortified, with the benefits of fortification going
exclusively or primarily to ration shop users. The Government of Pakistan
is presently considering the fortification of flour mill atta with vitamins
and minerals.
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through the maternal-child health system, and have had varying
levels of acceptance. The Government of Pakistan is presently
seeking to develop its own weaning food, manufactured domestically
from locally grown commodities. The advantage of using ration
shops for weaning food distribution is that, at least in urban
areas, the ration system reaches a far higher proportion of the
population than do the health centers. Even in rural areas, the
majority of the population purchases sugar at ration shops, while
only a small proportion visits the health centers, and then only
irregularly. Therefore it may be expected that a weaning food
handled by the ration system would be much more widely available
than is the case at present. The raw materials, processing and
packaging (if any) of such a weaning food should be designed to
meet the criteria, discussed earlier, for any food which is a
candidate for subsidized distribution.
One final possibility for expanding the nutritional impact
of the ration program would be to extend atta distribution to the
entire country. Apart from availability, logistical and cost
considerations, distribution in rural areas is thought unnecessary
by some on the assumption that farmers who produce their own wheat
keep what they need for household consumption before marketing the
rest. Many observers believe, however, that some small farmers
do not produce enough to fulfill the household's . consumption needs
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but still must have a marketable surplus to obtain cash to pay off
debts and pay for other needs. It is said that some farmers must
commit themselves to sales at below-market prices early in the
season in order to obtain credit for seeds and other inputs. These
farmers must buy grain at the higher prices which obtain later in the
year, because they could not retain sufficient grain from their own
production. Furthermore, landless agricultural laborers who receive
inadequate food as wages in kind are dependent on the open market
for any additional food they may be able to afford. On these grounds
a case could be made for extending subsidized atta distribution into
rural areas.
It appears unlikely, however, that the ration system would be
expanded in th.s manner. The cost would be exceedingly high, since
70% of the population lives in the countryside. The system would
have to operate differently, since it would be unnecessarily costly
to ship wheat to the cities for milling and then back again. Flour
mill atta is relatively unknown outside urban areas. At the same time,
wheat is not as much of an inferior good among the rural population;
its consumption does not decline with increasing income as much as in
the cities. Therefore, targeting would probably be less effective.
Most importantly, many of the reasons for the establishment of the
ration shops relate primarily or entirely to the urban population: implicit
subsidy to industry through price control of the key wage good ., and
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stabilization of the politically active masses. It is reasonable to
assume that the ration system for atta will continue to be confined,
with only a few exceptions, to urban areas.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Government intervention in agricultural prices traditionally
has been designed to affect farm production and farmer income,
with little attention being paid to the effects of these prices
on food consumption. High prices, which are considered desirable
because of their incentive effect on agricultural production,
often have at least a short-run negative impact on food consumption,
particularly in the developing nations where incomes are low and
the price elasticity of demand for food is high. A system of
government subsidies on the consumer prices of foods can reduce
the conflict between the objectives of increased production and of
adequate food consumption, by making up the difference between
administered producer and consumer prices. A number of low-income
countries have implemented such systems, usually for some combination
of the following reasons: 1) to distribute food equitably in a
shortage; 2) to minimize social disruption in the cities, often a
function of rising food prices; 3) to stimulate investment in the
industrial sector by keeping down the price of the key wage good;
4) to ensure that the needy can purchase an adequate diet. The primary
motivation for establishing food consumption subsidies has not been
nutritional improvement or income redistribution, yet under some circumstances
these functions can be well served by such programs.
Consumer price subsidies have been critized for their association
with the maintenance of low producer prices through government restrictions
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or bans on exports or through compulsory procurement at low,
administered prices. We have argued in this paper that the
policies which lead to low prices are not necessarily integral to
a program of consumer subsidies, but frequently exist for reasons
which are independent of these programs. Other commonly heard
criticisms of consumer price subsidies are that they are quite costly,
both financially and in terms of administrativetalent, and that
the benefit of the subsidies goes largely to the non-needypopulation.
We have proposed four conditions under which we believe that subsidized
consumption programs can partially circumvent these difficulties.
They are as follows: 1) The program must be able to alter the
absolute price level of the subsidized commodity, so that it can
respond to general inflation and keep its costs at an acceptable
level: 2) The amount of the subsidized commodity which can be purchased
must be limited, to prevent demand, stimulated by the artificially low
price, from far exceeding supply: 3) The benefits of the program
should be targeted as much as possible to the needy; in the paper
we argue that this targeting is best achieved by selecting for subsidy,
commodities of low quality and prestige value (but not low nutritional
value) which the non-needy will, in general ,choose not to buy. We believe
that administration of a means test in a low income country is usually
a cumbersome, costly and easily circumvented method of targeting.
4) The program should not monopolize trade in the subsidized commodity.
If a parallel free market exists, then producers who sell a portion
-71-
of their output to the government at less than optimal prices can
make up such losses by raising the price of the remainder to be
sold on the open market. Since the open market, with its higher
prices, is likely to be patronized by higher income groups with
a low price elasticity of demand for food, negative nutritional con-
sequences of these prices are unlikely.
An additional criticism of subsidized consumption programs,
usually leveled by nutritionists rather than by economists, is that
the benefits of such programs are usually limited to urban areas.
To argue against the program on these grounds, however, is to
forget that the primary purposes for establishing such a system
have not been nutritional, but rather political and economic,
and these purposEsrelate primarily to the urban population. It
should also be noted that in Pakistan, as in most low-income countries,
the highest proporition of severe malnutrition is found in urban
slums. This is not to argue against programs in the countryside,
but rather to say that opposition to subsidized consumption systems
on the grounds of urban-rural disparity may be a classic manifestation
of the perfect as an enemy of the good.
An additional. argument in favor of consumer price subsidies
is their political viability. They are popular and highly visible,
and accordingly are difficult to dismantle once they have been implemented
(an advantage or disadvantage depending on one's perspective). They
are not viewed as direct income transfers, and in cases where no
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means test is applied, they are perceived as benefitting the
entire population, not only the poor. Therefore, there is not
likely to be major resistance to their initiation. Furthermore,
these programs serve a number of objectives other than nutritional
ones, which gives them considerably greater strength than most
programs which are designed for welfare purposes alone. Clearly,
political acceptability is vital in judging the potential effective-
ness of any social program.
The ration shop system in Pakistan is a subsidized consumption
program which fulfills the four' conditions we have outlined above.
In this paper, we have described the operation of the program and
analyzed its nutritional and economic impact, its cost, the extent
of its dependence on foreign food aid, and the costs and benefits
of -possible program alterations. We find that the cost of the
program has been regulated by altering the retail price of the
commodity; that in 1974-5, program costs were about 10.8% of the
national operating budget; and that as foreign food aid has declined,
Pakistan has turned to the international market for its wheat, assisted
by financial aid from other Islamic nations. We conclude that the
targeting of benefits is relatively effective, and that the program
as it now exist has significant nutritional and income redistributional
effects, providing a supplement of 8.6% of calorie and 24% of protein
recommended intakes,* and an income increment of almost nine percent
* The standards used are WHO recommended intakes for an adult
male of moderate physical activity, relatively liberal standards
which may somewhat underestimate the supplementation. If FAO
regional requirement estimates were used instead, the caloric
contribution would be 14.25% of requirements to this group
(see footnote p.33)
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in the second lowest (Rs. 50-99) income class.* The reader should
be aware, as we are, that our analysis is based on information collected
in only two cities: Karachi and Lahore, which may not be representative
of urban Pakistan. In order to use these data, we also have had to
make a number of assumptions, the validity of which have yet to be
tested. Accordingly, our conclusions should be viewed as tentative,
and further empirical research must be carried out before we can
calculate with precision the effects of the program.
In light of Pakistan's experience, it appears that subsidized
consumption programs, operated under the conditions we have outlined,
can be of value in redistributing income and in supplementing the
dietary intake of low income groups. Nutritional status will be improved
to the extent that income is the factor most seriously limiting adequate
food intake. Clearly, price subsidies cannot, by themselves, educate,
or influence consumer behavior or patterns of intra-family food
distribution. The effectiveness of these programs in improving nutritional
status could be increased, however, by expanding the range of subsidized
commodities available and, quite possibly, by introducing foods for
specific target groups, such as weaning foods for young children under
the age of two. We believe that the concept of consumer food price
subsidies has important implications for nutritional well being, and
that it deserves further study from this perspective to determine under
what circumstances and in what form the effectiveness can be maximized.
* This is the additional food and real income generated by the
Government intervention (the food subsidy) and not the nutritional
and income value of the ration.

Appendix
A. Administrative Structure of the Ration System
The Food Department, headed by the Director of Food, is the
responsible agency for the rationing system at the provincial level.
The provincial Food Director establishes specific regulations
governing the relationship between procurement and storage centers,
mills, ration shops, and card holders, including the manner in which
purchasers are assigned to specific suppliers. The Food Department
also regulates the movement of grain between surplus and deficit
districts within the province. Each province is divided into regions,
which have a Deputy Director, Food and an Assistant Food Director
administering the rationing program. These officials are responsible
for procurement, quality control, storage, and issuance of wheat from
Provincial Reserve Centers (storage depots) to flour mills.* Both
Sind and Punjab are divided into two regions. The administrative
level below region is the district. There are 19 districts in Punjab,
and ten in Sind. Each district is headed by a District Food Controller.
The district Food Controller's staff of Food Inspectors and Food Grain
Supervisors operates at the tehsil level to make cash purchases of wheat
from farmers and grain merchants. The DFC can authorize additional
representatives to purchase grain if necessary. The DFC also makes
* In Karachi region, procurement does not take place, since wheat is
supplied from imports.
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decisions as to where and how grain shall be stored, whether in bulk
or in bags, and the type of godown (warehouse) to be used.
The District Food Controller in the larger cities, and, under
his supervision, the Ward Rationing Officers in smaller areas, receive
applications for ration cards from households and issue the cards.
Licenses to operate a ration shop are also issued at the District
level. The DFC keeps up-to-date recrods of the number of ration shops
currently operating, the number of ration cards (households) and units
(individuals) associated with each shop, and the quantity of atta and sugar
distributed each week and fortnight. Adjustments in the quantity
authorized to be issued to each shop are made on the basis of fluctuations
in the size of the registered population and in quantities of the
commodities distributed from week to week. That is, if part of a week's
quota is not purchased, that quantity is subtracted from the next week's
allotment. Below the district level, Rationing Inspectors (three to
four per ward) and Shop Inspectors (one to three per ward) work with
the Ward Rationing Officer, examining the records of the ration depot
owners and inspecting the depots.
Fig. I presents a table of organization of the rationing system.
Figure 1
Table of Organization:
Pakistan Ration System
Central Government ------------- Assistant Director, Food,
Ministry of Food and Agriculture
I
Province ------------------------ Director,Food,
Provincia Food Dept.
Region---------------------------Deputy Director of Food
Assistant Director of Food
Tehsil-----
rood
Inspector
Procurement and
Storage Distribut
Ward Rationing--------Ward
Officer
Food Grain
Supervisor
Shop
Inspectors
Rationing
Inspectors
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B. Logistics of Domestic Procurement of Wheat
During the harvest season from May to September, purchase centers
are established at central points throughout each province. In Sind,
there were 200 purchase centers in 1973-4, and in Punjab, there were
634. Sales may be made to the Government agents directly by the
growers or by grain merchants acting as brokers. It is the policy of
the government to encourage direct sales by farmers. To this end, local
officials are posted at each local market to provide information to
growers. The minimum sale to the Government is five bags, to allow
small farmers to enter the market. Gunny bags in which to deliver
wheat are supplied free to farmers making direct sales to the Government;
other sellers must leave a refundable deposit of Rs. 9.00 per bag.
Bags must be returned, filled, within seven days of issue, and an
account of the bags is kept at each purchase center. The cost of trans-
porting wheat to the purchase center is borne by the seller, but temporary
purchase centers may be set up close to growing areas if a given minimum
quantity is available, in order to facilitate sales. Growers who sell
directly to the Government are paid the full price of the grain on the
spot. Other sellers are paid 97% of the price, the remainder subject
to deductions for substandard quality, to be determined after laboratory
analysis of a sample of the wheat. Grain brokers are entitled to additional
charges for delivering grain to Government warehouses or to railheads.
These charges range from Rs. 0.10 per maund for delivery at the railway
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platform, to Rs. 0.19 per maund for delivery in Government bulk
storage bins.
The Food Department will purchase as much wheat as is voluntarily
offered for sale at the support price. Each district has a quota which
it must try to meet, but according to one food official in Punjab, the
quota is usually not met. During the 1970's the Government support
price of wheat has been below the open market price. This is one reason
that sufficient supplies are not forthcoming from farmers. Another
explanation was given by an agricultural economist from Sind 52who said
that small farmers and tenants must often commit themselves at the
beginning of the season to selling their crop at below the Government
support price in order to obtain credit, seeds, and other inputs from
the landlord or moneylender,and therefore they cannot take advantage
of the Government price guarantee.
C. Division of Domestic and Imported Supplies of Wheat
Punjab supplies grain for its own ration shop systemthat-of the
Northwest Frontier Province, and for Azad Kashmirand the army. From
May until about November, the mills in Punjab are supposed to receive
almost entirely,domestic wheat to mill into atta. For the remainder of
the year, imported wheat is to be supplied at a ratio of 50:50 with
domestic wheat. However, when domestic supplies are not sufficient, 100%
imported wheat is supplied to the mills. Table AI which shows the
quantities of imported and domestic wheat consumed in Lahore city in
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the twelve months of Fiscal 1972-3, indicates that there may not be
sufficient domestic wheat for the whole province, even during much of
the harvest season. During the year, only 23% of the wheat consumed
was from doemstic supplies, while 77% was imported. In Sind, the
supply of domestic wheat is smaller, and is kept within the province.
Domestic wheat is generally sent to areas of Sind other than Karachi,
because of higher transportation costs and the ready availability of
imported supplies in that city. Ration shop atta is supposed to
contain at least 25% domestic wheat, but often such supplies are not
available, and all imported wheat must be used. Table A-II shows the
relative distribution of domestically produced wheat to Karachi and
to the rest of Sind from 1970 to 1974. Karachi consistently receives
a half or less of the supply, although its population is larger than
that of all other towns in the province combined. Information on wheat
supply and procurement in Baluchistan and NWFP were not obtained. Both
are wheat deficit areas, although it is said that NWFP produces sufficient
wheat for its population, but exports it illegally to the Middle East
through Afghanistan, reducing available supplies. Careful study of
acreages and production figures for NWFP might give some indication
whether or not this is true.
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Table AI: Imported and Domestic Wheat Consumption, Lahore City a
Quantity Consumed (1000 maunds)
Imported Domestic TotalMonth/Year
94
1156
233
171
564
644.5
500
979
305
435
457
4782.5Total
July 1972
August 1972
September 1972
October 1972
November 1972
January 1973
February 1973
March 1973
April 1973
May 1973
June 1973
79
148
200
126
211
644
500
935
147
15
123
3670
15
8
33
45
33
0.5
0
44
158
420
334
1112.5
a. Source: MICAS Associates, Ltd., Roti:
Feasibility Study, report prepared for
Pakistan,Karachi, 1974
Table A-II: Domestic Wheat Issued to Sind
I -
Appendices to the
the Government of
(in tons) a
Procurement
186,521
188,190
83,632
212,305
Issue to Karachi
71,201
81,692
40,692
56,396
to Other Towns
115,320
106,498
42,940
155,909
a. Source: Micas Associates, Ltd, opcit.
Year
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
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D. Milling of Flour
There are 170 roller flour mills in Pakistan, of which 118 mill
53
atta for the Government. All atta for the ration system is ground
in roller mills. Table AIII shows the breakdown by province of
these mills.
Table A-III Distribution of Roller Flour Mills by Province
Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan
Total
Mills 98 50 17 5
Gov' t
Mills 58 38 17 5
a. Source: Pakistan Flour Millers Association. Lahore, 1975
Until October, 1974, mills which operated for the Government were allowed
a certain number of hours per day or days per week when they could mill
wheat on their own account. In addition, they were allowed a percentage
of Government-supplied wheat as a commission, and were permitted to
extract a given proportion of bran and fines from Government wheat
which they could sell privately, before milling ration atta. The specific
regulations as to percent of bran and fines to be removed varied from
time to time and from province to province, depending in part on the
supply situation. Under present law, every mill which produces
ration atta must operate entirely on Government account. It must
product 100% whole-meal atta, with no extractions. Officers of the
Food Department are stationed at every flour mill. They are responsible
for issuing atta to ration depot owners, and for keeping records of
-9-
the quantity of wheat received and milled and of atta issued by
the mill. They also monitor the quality of atta produced.
Mills purchase wheat at a Government-subsidized price, which
was Rs. 21.50 per maund in 1974-75. They are required to pay the
cost of transport from the government godown to the mill and the
cost of unloading the bags. Transport costs are about Rs. 1.00 per
bag (Rs. 0.40 per maund), and unloading charges are Rs. 0.10 per bag
(Rs. 0.04 per maund), so the total cost to the mill of a maund of
wheat was Rs. 21.94. Before October 1974, mills were allowed to
charge Rs. 1.15 per maund for milling, allowing a profit margin after
transport cost of Rs. 0.71. They also profited from the private sale
of maida*and bran extracted from the atta, and from the percentage of
wheat allowed as commission. Now that Government mills must process
all the wheat supplied into 100% whole meal atta, they are allowed
a profit margin of Rs. 1.99 on the selling price.
Mills are frequently alleged to engage in certain abuses and mal-
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practices regarding the processing of ration atta. They are said to
extract a higher percentage of fines and less bran than allowed in
the regulations. Since no extraction is now permitted, this situation
may no longer obtain, although it would still be possible for mills
illegally to extract fines. Other abuses of which mills are accused
include: 1) mixing cheap, spoiled wheat, other grains, ground stale
chapatis, and even sawdust in with the wheat before grinding;
* white flour
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2) dampening the gunny bags or the atta itself in order to add weight;
3) substituting old gunny bags for the new ones supplied by the government.
Although these practices are popularly discussed, there was no evidence
of them at the mill visited in the course of this study or in the
ration shops, where the quality of atta seemed to be good, based on
appearance, smell and feel. Nonetheless, the belief that they occur
influences the behavior of consumers.
E. Ration Shop Management
a) Owner Eligibility
In order to operate a ration depot, the prospective owner
must apply to the DistrictFood Controller stating his name and parentage,
his occupation, how long he has been trading in rationed foodstuffs,
the annual volume of his business, other authorizations held or applied
for, and the location and particulars of the proposed shop. The applicant
must also list relatives in the Food Department. According to the
regulations, applicants with relatives in the Food Department are not
permitted to own ration shops, although it is said that this rule is
not observed. The distribution of shops in an area is supposed to be
determined by the density of the user population. A shop serves an
average of 3,000 individuals, and is not permitted to serve more than
6,000. If the registered population of a shop approaches the upper
limit, an additional shop is authorized in the neighborhood, and the
user population divided between the two. Some individuals have stated
that in fact, the ration system is operated by the Pakistan People's Party,
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and that the granting and withdrawal of licenses is made on the basis
of service and demonstrated loyalty to the Party. If the shops are
nonetheless distributed evenly throughout the areas served, and if
they are operated according to regulations, it is not clear that the
granting of licenses based on patronage would necessarily prevent the
benefits of the program from reaching the population.
b) Purchase of Ration Supplies
Ration shop owners are authorized to purchase a given amount
of atta every week, and of sugar every fortnight. The authorization
is issued weekly (for atta), or fortnightly (for sugar) by the District
Food Controller's office, based on the number of users registered with
the shop for that time period, with deductions for quantities left
unsold at the end of the previous period. In order to make a purchase,
the owner first deposits the exact amount to pay for the authorized
quantity in a branch of the state bank, and receives a voucher, called
a challan, which he then takes to the mill to exchange for atta, or
to the government godown for sugar. Food Department employees at the
mill or the warehouse keep records of the quantities and recipients of
commodities disbursed. The transaction takes place a few days before
the time when these goods are to be distributed. Shop owners must
pay for transportation and loading of their supplies. According to
several shop owners in Karachi and Lahore, the supply of atta and
sugar is reliable. Occasionally, they say, they must use not the
nearest godown, but one slightly farther away. This raises
transport costs, according to one shopkeeper in Karachi, from Rs. 1.00
to Rs. 1.25 per bag. It was generally agreed that almost never were
supplies unavailable. However, it should also be remembered that
not only are Lahore and Karachi the two largest cities in the country,
and therefore likely to have reliable channels of distribution, but
also they are in wheat surplus areas where supply would not be expected
to be a problem. Shop owners in NWFP and Baluchistan should be interviewed
to determine the supply situation in these remote areas.
c) Record Keeping
Shop owners keep detailed records of every transaction
involving rationed commodities.* In a ledger is recorded the card
number, the date, and the quantity of each item purchased in each
transaction. The shop owner also indicates in the customer's ration
book how much of his allotment for that period has been purchased.
Then the customer obtains a receipt for payment, which he exchanges
for his purchases. A separate ledger lists the current size of the
registered user population, broken down by the number of households,
individuals, adults, and minors authorized to use the shop.
This list is based on changes in the ration population recorded in the
office of the District Food Controller. The shop's records are supposed
to be checked regularly by a Rationing Inspector or a shop Inspector.
Some shop owners showed the writer the places where an inspector had
reviewed and signed the ledger. Others said that the inspectors knew
* In Sind, ration shops are permitted to sell non-rationed goods as
well as ration atta and sugar. In Punjab, only rationed commodities
may be sold.
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them personally and did not bother to check their records. In every
case in which a shop was visited, however, shop owners had their
ledgers out and were recording transactions, and customers were
routinely handing over their ration books. Ration shop visits
were not planned in advance, so it may be inferred that keeping
these records is standardprocedure. The accuracy with which they are
kept could not be verified.
d) Economics of ration shop operation
At the present time (September, 1975) a ration shop owner
can buy a bag of atta weighing 2 maunds (about 200 pounds) for
Rs. 80.00 (including bag), and a 2 maund bag of sugar for Rs. 220.00.
The shop owner must also pay the cost of loading and transport from
the government godown to his shop, which is between Rs. 1.00 and 1.25
per bag for atta. The transport cost may be somewhat less for sugar,
which is less bulky. The profit allowed on a bag of sugar is one rupee;
on a bag of atta, it is Rs. 1.25. In addition, the shop owner sells
the jute bags in which the atta is supplied, and the cotton bags from
the sugar. Jute bags sell for Rs. 4.00 to 7.00, and cotton bags for
Rs. 2.50 to 6.00. Since the profit margin on the sale of rationed
commodities is largely taken up by transport costs, the shop keeper's
income derives primarily from the sale of the bags. The size of the
shopkeeper's income depends on the quantity of sugar and atta which
he sells. One ration shop owner in a low income neighborhood of Karachi
(New Karachi) had a registered population of 6,000 individuals (the maximum
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permitted). He reported that his customers purchase all that they
are entitled to, and that he received 58 bags of sugar every fortnight,
and 100 bags of atta every week. Assuming an average price of Rs. 4.00
per bag, which is probably on the low side, this owner could sell about
516 bags per month,for a gross income of roughly Rs. 2064. Out of
this, he must pay for rent and electricity in his shop, and the salary
of his assistant, who weighs and distributes commodities to the customers.
This shop owner estimated his net income at Rs. 1500 per month, in the
99th percentile of household incomes. Shop owners with a smaller
registered user population would of course have lower incomes.
Ration shop owners may also engage illegally in black market sales
of sugar and open market sales of the ration atta. Sugar is reported
to sell for Rs. 8.00 to 10.00 per kg. on the black market, compared
with Rs. 4.00 per kg. in urban ration shops. The ration price of
atta is Rs. 37.00 per maund, compared with about Rs. 48.00 on the
open market. Of course it was not possible to determine directly the
extent of black market and illegal sales. In the ration shops visited,
customers did not appear concerned that supplies might run out:
there were no long lines or jostling for a better position. It must
be remembered, however, that ration shops were visited only in Lahore
and Karachi, during the very end of the harvest season. In the village
of Kot-na-Jibullah in NWFP, no ration shops were visited, but residents
reported that when a shipment arrived, there were long lines at the shops,
and that people lost time from work in order to obtain their allotment
before the supplies were exhausted. Similarly, in the Telephone Colony
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of Haripur, consumers said they lost time from work waiting in
line at the ration shop.
This might be due to supplies being diverted, or simply to
their being less readily available in an area rather distant from
the source of supply. One shop owner admitted that when a customer
did not claim his entire allotment of atta for a week, he would record
a sale anyway and sell it to a needy person who required extra, or to
a poor migrant who had no ration card. No ration shop keeper reported
customers failing to purchase their sugar quota. However, the
Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 1971-2 reported lower per
capita consumption of sugar amarg the majority of the urban and rural
population than would be the case if all consumers used their full
allotment. The possibility exists that some proportion of sugar supplies
is not purchased, either because the consumer cannot afford his whole
quota, or because it is not available, and that this quantity may
be diverted to the black market. Some shopkeepers may also obtain extra
sugar through bogus cards, or other means.
e) Program coverage, shop location and hours of operation
The ration shop system operates primarily in urban areas.
The rationale for this is that in rural areas, the population has access
to land on which to grow wheat, and so has less need of the program.
A more likely explanation is that urban areas tend to be politically more
active and well organized, and so are better able to make their needs
felt and obtain a response on the part of the Gvernment. Rural areas
are also supposed to be served by ration shops which distribute sugar
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regularly, and wheat during periods of scarcity such as the month
before harvest. The density of distribution of these shops varies.
In Lahore and Karachi, there are sufficient ration shops to cover
the entire population. In Lahore, there are 1258 ration shops for
a registered population of 4,200,000 or an average of one shop for
every 3,260 individuals. In Karachi, 2,492 shops serve a registered
population of 5, 110,000, yielding an average of one shop for every
2050 persons. The shops appeared to be evenly distributed throughout
those cities, so that each neighborhood was served by a ration shop
close by. It may be that the smaller user population per shop in
Karachi is made possible by the fact that shop owners may sell general
provisions as well as rationed commodities, and so are not entirely
dependent on the size of the registered population for their income.
In Kot-na-Jibullah, a village near Haripur, NWFP, statistics on the
number of ration ,shops were not obtained, but people reported problems
of long waiting lines and supplies running out, and stated that one
ration shop in Hairpur served 14,000 households. This was reported
to be a central shop, from which neighboring villages obtained their
supplies. Nonetheless, it would appear that this smaller city, further
from the source of supply of grain, was less well served by the ration
system than the large metropolises. It is worth mentioning that in
every town and city visited, every person who was questioned knew where
his or her ration shop was and what were its hours of operation.
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Statistics on the distribution of shops in rural areas were not
readily available. In Sheikhupura District of Punjab, a rich wheat
producing area, the District Food Controller reported that there were
1,498 ration shops serving his district's population of 1.6 million.
Of these, 102 were urban shops in ten towns, and the rest were rural.
This would indicate an average of almost one shop for every thousand
individuals. In one village of only one or two hundred people in Sind,
about 40 miles from Hyderabad, residents said their ration shop was a
few miles away, but indicated that they used it regularly. In the
village of Kot-na-Jibullah, residents reported that they had one
ration shop to serve the whole population of 13,000. Clearly, the
situation varies considerably from one area to another, and systematic
collection of figures from a number of regions is necessary for an
assessment of the adequacy of distribution of ration shops.
Urban shops are open five days a week, from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m.
and from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m. The shops are closed on Thursdays and
Sundays. At the shops visited in Lahore and Karachi, there were steady
streams of customers during store hours, but no large crowds or long
lines. In rural areas, shops are supposed to be open the first ten
days of each month, but some consumers in one village reported that
the shop simply opens when supplies are received, and closes when
they are exhausted. Villages are apparently small enough so that
word-of-mouth is sufficient announcement that the shop is open.
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F. User Eligibility
Use of the ration shops is not restricted by income. The only
criterion for participation is residence (temporary or permanent) in
a city or town served by the program. Application for a ration card
must be made to the District Food Controller or to a Rationing Officer.
The application lists the name, address, and occupation of the head
of the household, and the number of adults (over 14), minors (aged
two through 14), and children under two in the family. The information
must be attested to by a magistrate or party officer before a card
can be issued. Once issued, the card is valid until the space to
record purchases is used up. Ration "cards" are actually booklets
which are good for about three years. Migrant workers and other
transients can apply for a temporary ration card which is in the
form of a single sheet and is good for only a few months.
It is known that an enormous number of false ration cards are
in use. In the city of Karachi, for example, the 1972 census showed
a population of 3,469,000, yet in 1974-75, there were 5,110,000
individuals registered on ration cards. Similarly in Lahore, the 1972
census gave a population of 2,148,000, while the ration population in
55*
1975 was 4,200,000. The abuses resulting in these bogus cards include
people claiming more family members than they have, and people registering
the same family in more than one place. It is also possible that some
shop owners fabricate applications for cards in order to obtain excess
supplies of atta and sugar to sell on the open market, although this
* Part of the discrepancy would be explained by the large number of
recent migrants in the labor force who leave their families in
the village.
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practice was not mentioned by people in Pakistan familiar with the
program. It was impossible to determine to whom the benefits of
the bogus ration cards go, but it may be assumed that people with
greater influence are better able to get a bogus ration card approved.
This would mean that those with higher income and/or those with a
degree of power in the party received disproportionate benefits from
the ration shop program. Of course, shop owners also benefit from
an increase in the volume of their business.
G. Manner of Purchase
In order to make a purchase at a ration shop, a customer must
present his card and state what he wishes to buy. The shop owner
records the purchase in the ration book and in his own ledger, receives
payment, and issues a receipt which the customer then presents to the
shop's assistant, who gives him the commodities he needs. There is
no requirement that the whole allotment be purchased at one time, but
it must be purchased within the week (for atta) or fortnight (for sugar)
or that period's allotment is forfeited. One shop owner reported
that he encouraged people to buy their whole ration at once, to save
paperwork, and that he occasionally extended credit to customers he
knew to enable them to do so. Other shop owners said that they would
not sell on credit. Availability of credit may well be one factor
determining the extent to which to poorest segments of the population
use the ration shops.
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The individual making the purchase appeared most frequently to
be the male head of the household. A large proportion of purchases
were teenage boys, and little boys also made some purchases. Quite
a small proportion of purchases were made by females, and those were
usually ederly women or little girls. The culture of Pakistan is
such that adult women are discouraged from leaving the house to do
shopping or other chores. This has implications for the ration
system in terms of its potential as a disseminator of nutrition
education. The study of grain consumption habits in Karachi and
Lahore, mentioned earlier, confirmed that adult females make purchases
outside the home very infrequently. Tables A-IV and A-V show the
income group breakdown of household members who purchase bread from
outside the home. These are likely to be the same individuals who
do other shopping as well.
Table A-IV: Family Member Who Purchases Bread (Karachi)a
Monthly House- Adult Adult Teenage Deli-
hold Income No. Male Female Male Child Servant Varies vered
4250 81 22% 6% 11% 6% 1% 27% 26%
251-500 133 28% 2% 11% 10% 3% 35% 10%
501-700 82 24% 3% 11% 6% 5% 44% 7%
701-1500 99 19% - 7% 2% 15% 38% 18%
:71500 76 10% 5% 9% - 40% 17% 17%
a. Source: Nasir-ud Dean Associates, Roti Report prepared for the government
of Pakistan, Karachi, 1974.
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Table A-V: Family Member Who Purchases Bred ~(Lahore)a
Monthly House- Adult Adult Tennage Deli-
hold Income No. Male Female Male Child Servant Varies vered
< 250 30 30% - 20% 17% - 27% 7%
251-500 72 26% 1% 14% 13% 10% 32% 4%
501-700 46 28% 2% 13% 4% 20% 30% 2%
701-1500 74 22% - 11% 8% 27% 30% 3%
> 1500 24 25% 4% 13% - 21% 25% 13%
a. Source: Nasir-ud-Deen Associates, op. cit
H. Quality of Rationed Commodities
Prepared flour is considered an inferior product in Pakistan.
People generally prefer to obtain whole wheat and have it ground
themselves by a chakki*, so they can be sure that the resulting
flour is unadulterated. When prepared flour is purchased, fine
white flour (maida) is valued more than whole wheat flour. The
atta distributed by ration shops is considered a poorer quality
because it is made largely from imported wheat, which produces a
bread which is darker in color than that from domestic varieties.
Public estimation of ration atta is higher in Lahore, where the
flour is more frequently made from locally produced wheat, than in
Karachi, where the flour is more frequently made from imported
grain. While allegations are frequently made that ration atta
is adulterated with ground stale bread and rotten grain, it was the
experience of this writer that these charges were made by relatively
higher-income individuals who did not themselves consume the flour.
* a small local grinding unit
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A number of purchasers at one shop in a low-income area stated that
the atta was a little worse in quality, and slightly higher in bran
than that on the open market, but that the difference was not great.
One shop owner in an upper-class area of Karachi said that he himself
used ration atta and found it perfectly acceptable, and that he felt
the assumed quality differences were imyth. Nonetheless, the myth is
widely believed, and has a powerful influence on consumer behavior.
The survey of grain consumers in Karachi and Lahore asked their
respondents several questions about their evaluation of various kinds
of flour. Their results are presented in the three sets of tables below
(Tables A-VII through A-XI). It is clear that ration atta is considered
lower in quality than other kinds of flour. Thus the distribution of
ration atta automatically targets itself toward low-income consumers.
Table A-VI: Consumer Opinion of Atta by Source (Karachi)a
Type of Atta No. Re- Very Very
pondents Good Good O.K. Bad Bad
Ration 687 1% 17% 23% 58% 2%
Open Mkt. 268 16% 61% 16% 7% -
Mix 192 2% 5% 92%* 2% 1%
Self-
Ground 310 33% 66% 1% - -
a. the source for this and the tables which follow is Nasir-ud-Deen,
Roti Report, opcit.
* 87% said ration atta is unacceptable by itself, so they mix in some
open market atta.
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Table A-VII: Consumer Opinion of Atta by Source (Lahore)
Type of Atta No. Res- Very Very
pondents good Good O.K. Bad Bad
4% 29% 27%
9% 48% 25%
9% 18% 64%
36% 4%
17% 1%
9%
45% 46% 7% 2%
Ration
Open Mkt.
Mix
Self-
496
360
11
Ground 163
Table A-VIII: Good Qualities of Atta by Source (Karachi)
Good White Good
Roti* Roti Tast
Soft Unadult- Easily
e Roti erated Kneaded
6% 3% 3% 2% 0
39% 23% 15% 15% 5%
19% 2% 3% 2% 1%
43% 20% 75% 17% 21%
Beittertan No Good
Cheap Healthy Ration Other Qualities
3% 7% 2%
9%
3%
4%
4%
1%
7%
1% 77%
4% 2% 29%
3% 1% 72%
3% 4% 14%
Table A-IX: Good Qualities of Atta by Source (Lahore)
Source of No. Re- Good Easily Baked White Soft Good Unadult- Better than No Good
Atta sponses Roti (and kneaded) Roti Roti Taste erated Ration Other Qualities
Ration 496 11% 10% 14% 4% 2% 1% - 2% 65%
Open Mkt. 360 21% 16% 12% 13% 10% 2% 7% 3% 41%
Mix 11 - 27% - - 9% 9% - - 64%
Self
Ground 163 26% 25% 7% 21% 15% 20% 7% 5% 23%
*the most common Pakistani (bread-like) wheat preparation
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Source of
Atta
Ration
Open Mkt.
Mix
Self
Ground
No. Res-
ponses
687
286
192
310
Table A-X: Bad Qualities of Atta by Source (Karachi)
Source of No. Re- Red Adult- Incon- Hard Bad Sticky, Bad No Bad
Atta sponses Color erated sistent Roti Roti Unhealthy Rubbery Taste Other Quality
Ration 687 49% 35% 20% 16% 10% 7% 4% 4% 1% 23%
Open Mkt. 286 6% 9% 5% 4% 3% 2% 3% 0 1% 75%
MIx 192 5% 3% 1% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% - 91%
Self-
Ground 310 - 2% 2% 0 - - - - - 95%
Table A-XI: Bad Qualities of Atta by Source (Lahore)
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Source of No. Re- Incon- Adult- Hard Bad Bad Red Un Bad Sticky, No Bad
Atta sponses insistent erated Roti Roti Smell Color HealthyTaste Coarse Rubbery Other Quality
Ration 496 44% 12% 12% 8% 8% 5% 4% 3% 3% 1% 3% 34%
Open Mkt. 360 26% 10% 5% 3% 3% 4% 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 57%
Mix 11 36% 18% 18% - - - - - - - - 45%
Self
Ground 163 7% 2% 1% - - - - - - - 1% 91%
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